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 This thesis explores the effects of the U.S. using different definition and concepts 
of energy security on policy.  U.S. energy policy has long been characterized as being 
internally inconsistent, lacking coordination, and lacking long-term strategy.  The 
project’s overarching hypothesis is that without a definition or concept of energy 
security, U.S. energy security strategy will continue to be captured by special interests 
(both inside and outside of government), and U.S. energy policy will continue to lack 
cohesion and overall coordination.  The paper’s three chapters follow an identical format.  
A research question is posed, followed by an analysis.  In Chapter 1, the thesis explores 
the effects of the Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline.  Chapter 2 focuses on the effects on 
policy when the U.S. Department of Defense has defined and conceptualized ‘energy 
security,’ while Congressional jurisdictions with oversight have not conceptualized the 
term.  The final chapter examines the agency that is assumed to be the driver of energy 
policy, the U.S. Department of Energy, and how it affects the development of U.S. 
energy policy.    The results of this paper indicate that the criticism of U.S. energy policy 
is well deserved, as it is inconsistent, contradictory and lacks a long-term vision.  This 
thesis proposes that the reason for such a lack of consistency or long-term strategy may 
be linked to the lack of a conception or definition of ‘energy security.’  At the conclusion 
of the thesis, policy recommendations are made, as well as suggestions for future areas of 
study on the topic. 
Thesis Advisors: Dr. Sarah O’Byrne, Dr. Blake Ethridge, and Dr. Benjamin Ginsberg 
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 The U.S. has been trying to craft a national policy to increase its ‘energy security’ 
or ‘energy independence’ ever since the 1973 Arab Embargo.  For much of this time, the 
U.S. has struggled with energy policy aimed at increasing energy security.  While the 
U.S. has passed major pieces of legislation aimed at increasing energy security or energy 
independence, the U.S. has found itself repeating the process with each change in 
administration.    
   Despite a plethora of legislation bearing the words “Energy Independence” or 
Energy Security” in their titles, little seems to change when it comes to measuring 
whether the legislation has the intended effect of actually increasing U.S. energy  
security.  This may be in part because no legislation, or federal agency overseeing energy 
policy, has bothered to first define and conceptualize what, exactly, energy security is to 
the U.S. 
 While the term ‘energy security’ is elusive, it is nevertheless important to come to 
a consensus of its meaning and definition, in order to create a cohesive, clear, well-
defined strategy that is consistent yet flexible when needed to respond to the constantly 
changing and unpredictable commodity that is energy.  The importance of energy is well 
understood.  It is the lifeblood of the U.S. economy, and carries with it military, political, 
and social ramifications.  It is therefore imperative to have an energy security strategy in 
place for the nation. 
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 This thesis examines the non-conceptualization of ‘energy security’ surrounding 
U.S. energy policy, and its effects on the ability of the U.S. to have an effective national 
energy security strategy.  The paper endeavors to add to the limited body of work on how 
different definitions or concepts of ‘energy security’ within a government will create 
policies that lack cohesion and are often inconsistent or at odds with each other.  When a 
government fails to conceptualize energy security, it leaves a vacuum which may be 
filled either by special interests or politicians with narrow political agendas.  Each 
chapter of this thesis will examine a current conflict involving the issue of ‘energy 
security,’ and how a conceptualization of the issue may have averted the policy conflict. 
 Chapter 1 of this portfolio examines the Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL), an issue 
that has been in the news for several years now.  At issue is the assertion by the pipeline’s 
owner, TransCanada, that KXL will increase the ‘energy security’ of the U.S.  
TransCanada offers no way of measuring this objectively, and merely relies on the key 
words of ‘energy security’ to pressure the U.S. government into approving the project.  
Since the U.S. Department of State, in charge of approving the project, has no definition, 
concept, or long-term strategy for U.S. energy security, a simple concept of the term is 
used, one which takes into account Availability, Affordability, Energy & Economic 
Efficiency, and the Environment.   The ability of KXL to increase U.S. energy security is 





 Chapter 2 of this portfolio continued to explore the idea that in order to have an 
effective and cohesive energy strategy, a concept of the term must first be established.  In 
the second chapter, the new DOD Energy Strategy is examined, in which the DOD has 
defined and conceptualized energy security for the first time.  Recognizing the 
overreliance and vulnerability such reliance on fossil fuels presents to the military both at 
home and at military bases abroad, the DOD has sought to diversify its fuel source based 
on its new concept of ‘energy security.’   
However, despite recognizing vulnerabilities and making policy changes to 
minimize threats presented by fossil fuels, DOD has received massive pushback from 
Congress regarding its investment in biofuels.  This thesis posits that the pushback from 
Congress is the result of the lack of a definition or conceptualization of the term from the 
various committees that have jurisdiction over energy policy.  Chapter 2 examines this 
conflict in an attempt to better understand the standoff. 
Chapter 3, the final chapter in this portfolio, examines the role of the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) in creating national energy policy.  As the only executive 
level cabinet agency with ‘energy’ in its title, an analysis of energy security would not be 
complete without examining the DOE.  The origins of the DOE are examined, as well as 
the DOE budget, to see if its budget priorities reflect the mission of the department, and 
are oriented in a way as such to allow the department to coordinate and oversee a 
cohesive national energy security strategy.   
 
 4 
The idea of ‘fragmentation’ is discussed, in which policy is so fragmented by 
different, competing centers of power as to make policy ineffective.  This is accompanied 
by charts that illustrate just how fragmented energy policy in the U.S. is.  In a rather 
surprising finding, the analysis presented finds that the DOE is not the driver of energy 
policy as it should.  As a result, energy policies by other, various agencies are often 
contradictory and at odds with each other. 
 Finally, an overarching conclusion is presented that summarizes the portfolio’s 
findings, and recommends areas for future study.  The findings of the last chapter help to 
inform the first two chapters, and bring the larger issues prohibiting the formulation and 
implementation of a national energy security strategy to light.  Additionally, the final 
pages are used to propose a few policy recommendations based on the findings of the 
analysis within the context of this thesis.  
 
 5 




 September 2012 marked the 5-year anniversary of TransCanada’s application to 
build the Keystone XL pipeline (KXL), a 1,179-mile long pipeline that would ship 
Canadian heavy crude oil to the U.S. Gulf Coast for refining.  A decision to allow the 
construction of the pipeline has still not been reached, highlighting the contentious debate 
surrounding the pipeline, and whether the pipeline can have a positive affect on U.S. 
energy security.  One reason a decision has still not been reached may stem from the lack 
of a single, cohesive, and conceptualized definition from the U.S. government of the term 
‘energy security’ from which to make such policy decisions.  Added to this lack of a 
common concept are the competing government institutions given authority over the 
KXL pipeline approval process having different concepts of energy security and differing 
policy goals, in this case between the U.S. Congress and U.S. Department of State.  This 
chapter will examine the competing concepts and lack of ‘energy security’ definitions in 
the U.S. Congress and U.S. Department of State, and the implications this poses for the 
KXL pipeline and U.S. energy policy.   
An often-repeated refrain from proponents of the KXL pipeline is that the pipeline 
is in the national interest of the U.S., and will help increase U.S. energy security. 
TransCanada has stated in its Presidential Permit Application that it is in the national 
interest of the U.S. to build the KXL pipeline, and further states that the pipeline would 
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reduce U.S. reliance on oil imports from countries such as Venezuela, Mexico, the 
Middle East, Africa, and other unstable regions.
1
  Recent turmoil in Venezuela and the 
Middle East, combined with the long-held political desire to wean the U.S. from Middle 
Eastern oil and achieve energy independence makes such an argument appealing.  
This chapter will seek to explore what effects the lack of a conceptualization of 
the term ‘energy security’ has on U.S. energy policy, through the prism of the KXL 
pipeline.  First, a literature review will present an overview of the competing definitions 
and concepts of energy security.  This is necessary in order to frame the current debate 
surrounding the KXL pipeline that will allow an analysis of the pipeline’s effects on U.S. 
energy security.  The analysis from the literature review will allow this chapter to answer 
two key questions: How will the KXL pipeline affect U.S. energy security?  As will be 
outlined in a case study of the pipeline, the KXL pipeline will not have a positive effect 
on U.S. energy security.  Secondly, how has the inability of the U.S. government to 
define a single concept of energy security affected U.S. energy policy?  Unsurprisingly, 
the answer is negative.  The lack of conceptualization of the issue has allowed special 
interests to shape U.S. energy policy under the guise of ‘energy security’, and resulted in 
policy gridlock, which the KXL pipeline exemplifies.  The literature review and the case 
study of the pipeline will present the overarching hypothesis of this chapter:  Given the 
policy proposals coming from the current Administration and Congress regarding energy 
security, the U.S. government should have formulated a clear definition and 
conceptualization of energy security and should be enacting policies that reflect a 
                                                          
1
 TransCanada, Presidential Permit Application, May 4, 2012: 1-2, 9. 
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common goal of increasing U.S. energy security.  Finally, the conclusion of this chapter 
will offer an analysis on how the KXL pipeline demonstrates that the U.S. government 
lacks a definition and conceptualization of ‘energy security’, allowing special interests to 




In order to address these questions, the literature review will focus on analyzing 
the many diverse definitions and concepts of what ‘energy security’ is.  The goal of this 
analysis is to provide a framework for a case study of the KXL pipeline, as well as U.S. 
energy security.  This analysis will also highlight the different definitions of energy 
security that are used within the U.S. government, complicating the policies that the U.S. 
government pursues in its efforts to increase the nation’s energy security. 
What is energy security?  A recent study found 45 definitions of the term ‘energy 
security.’
2
  Energy security has become a highly politicized and multi-faceted concept, 
and the 45 definitions found reflect this idea.  The 45 definitions found diverge in scope 
and meaning, depending on what interest, agency, or government is defining the term.  
Langlois-Bertrand has suggested that the myriad of definitions for ‘energy security’ 
prevents a clear object from emerging, or even a definition at all.
3
  Similarly, Alhaji 
believes that the concept of energy security is elusive, and finding a clear definition of the 
                                                          
2
 Benjamin Sovacool, Defining, measuring, and exploring energy security, Routledge Handbook of Energy 
Security, ed. Benjamin Sovacool, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011): 3. 
3
 Simon Langlois-Bertrand, Defense R&D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, The 





  Ciuta, on the other hand, believes that the pervasiveness of literature on 
the subject may have made the term ‘energy security’ meaningless.
5
  However the term 
may be defined, as a definition and concept of the term is necessary for policy.  At its 
most basic, policy implies purpose in an issue.  In order for a government to develop a 
comprehensive and cohesive response to an issue, it must first define and conceptualize 
the issue.  In this case, it is necessary for the U.S. to define and conceptualize the term 
‘energy security’ so that it may develop a proper response to the issue.  Alhaji believes 
such a definition is difficult because energy security is a cross between several policy 
areas, including economic and environmental policy, among others.
6
  However, to 
believe that the term is meaningless is unfounded; if the U.S. is to develop a cohesive 
energy policy response to increase the nation’s energy security, it must first define and 
conceptualize the subject.  Failure to conceptualize the issue may allow special interests 
to formulate policy that is not conducive to increasing U.S. energy security, and also 
result in policy gridlock.        
For decades, much of the developed world used a simple, narrowly defined 
definition for energy security, defined as the availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices.
7
  Traditionally, this has only been in reference to oil, the world’s most 
valuable traded commodity.  When discussing energy security, Mulligan argues that the 
                                                          
4
 A F Alhaji, “What is Energy Security? (Part III),” petroleumworld.com, last modified November 11, 
2007, http://petroleumworld.com/SF07111101.htm. 
5





 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, No. 2 (2006): 70. 
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perspective of the state is the most relevant.
8
  For states, the core concern regarding 
energy security relies in the relationship between securing energy and state security.
9
  For 
states in the modern era, power is derived and directly related to energy availability, in 
both military and economic dimensions.  This was true during much of the past century, 
as energy was a focal point in many conflicts.
10
  The OPEC oil embargo during the 1970s 
demonstrated the vulnerability of economies to energy supply disruptions, and thus made 
the supply of energy a concern of national security for states.  During the 1980s and 
1990s, the emergence of environmentalism added another dimension to energy security.
11
  
The dimension of environmentalism is still associated with energy security, and is now 
considered in terms of sustainability and the impact on the environment from which 
energy is drawn from. 
In order to maintain energy security today, according to Yergin, nations must 
follow several principles.
12
  A well-known principal includes the diversification of 
supply.  Contemporary experience, Yergin argues, has highlighted the need for new 
principles to guide energy security, which include recognition of the global energy 
security system, and acknowledgement that the entirety of the energy supply chain needs 
protection.
13
  Yergin’s acknowledgement of multiple principals guiding energy security is 
an echo of Alhaji’s assertion that energy security cuts across several policy areas.  The 
                                                          
8
 Shane Mulligan, The Changing Face of Energy Security, Prepared for the 80
th
 Annual Conference of the 






 Ibid. 7. 
12
 Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 75.   
13
 Ibid. 76. 
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multiplicity of factors to consider in such a definition only lends credence to the 
complexity and politicization of the issue, as it entails multiple policy areas.        
  The multitude of meanings has also contributed to niche concepts and definitions 
of energy security, placing primacy on one dimension of the definition over others, often 
at the expense of a narrow view of the issue.  Müller-Kraenner suggests that energy 
security has a different meaning for each country.
14
  This implies that there exist different 
interpretations of security, depending on whether a nation is an importer or exporter of 
energy (oil).  To support this, Yergin argues that energy-exporting countries define 
security in terms of “security of demand.”
15
  For countries that rely on petroleum exports 
for government revenue, this is of particular concern.   
On the other hand, there is the “security of supply” for energy-importing 
countries.  To this end, nations seek diversification in energy suppliers and sources.
16
  
The security of supply can be further broken down into contingent and structural risks.  
Contingent risks are considered to be major threats to supply security, and include 
unpredictable events, whether those events are political, military, or facility and 
transportation accidents.
17
  Structural risks to supply include the possibility of a 
“producers’ embargo.”
18
  The most well known ‘producers embargo’ was the OPEC 
embargo of the 1970s.  Despite the juxtaposition of the two terms, the security of demand 
is equally important as the security of supply. 
                                                          
14
 Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security: Re-Measuring the World (London: EarthScan, 2008): 20. 
15
 Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 71. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ken Koyama, “Risk and Uncertainty in the Changing Global Energy Market: Implications for the Gulf,” 
Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004: 81. 
18
 Ibid. 82. 
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 Fried and Trezise have a narrow view of the concept of energy security, and 
assert that increased security in oil is not the same as greater self-sufficiency in domestic 
production.  Rather, the authors argue that security is in “avoiding sudden, substantial, 
and potentially prolonged rise” in the price of oil.
19
  Such a narrow view may be 
appropriate, considering that there is only one market for oil, and it is the global market.  
As Yergin notes, security resides in the stability of this market for every country.
20
  
Petroleum was the most-consumed energy source in the U.S. in 2011.
21
  For a nation that 
consumes such a large amount of petroleum, price stability would seem to play a large 
part in its definition and concept of energy security.  However, such a narrow view of 
energy security is inappropriate.  Today, there are many sources that nations derive their 
energy from, and oil is but one source of energy.   
Despite the abundance of scholarly literature pertaining to the subject of energy 
security, there is a weakness in the literature that is reflected by the absence of discussion 
on the impact of a lack of a definition and conceptualization of ‘energy security’ from the 
government, and the inconsistent energy policies that are a result of this lack of 
conceptualization.  Ciuta suggests that this lack of understanding affects not only how 
energy policies are pursued, but also how actors think about security.
22
  There is no better 
example of this than the U.S. government, which has varying concepts and definitions of 
‘energy security’ ranging from various departments, agencies, and branches of 
government, including Congress, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, 
                                                          
19
 Edward Fried and Philip Trezise, Oil Security: Retrospect and Prospect (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1993): 4. 
20
 Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 76. 
21
 “U.S. Energy Consumption,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed March 18, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9210. 
22
 Ciuta, Conceptual Notes on Energy Security, 124. 
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and the Department of Energy.  The U.S. Congress has never defined the term ‘energy 
security’.   The U.S. Department of State, however, defines the term as “having access to 
secure, reliable, and ever-cleaner sources of energy.”
23
  Another U.S. Government entity, 
the Department of Defense, defines the term differently yet again: “having assured access 
to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to 
meet operational needs.”
24
  The Department of Defense’s definition and concept of the 
term will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 2.  Further still, two recent legislative 
bills totaling over 1,500 pages directly tied to energy policy and energy security failed to 
define or conceptualize the term.
25
     
Each definition defines ‘energy security’ in broad, ambiguous terms, with little 
tangible direction.  They also leave uncertain policy choices.  What is “affordable”?  
What is “abundant”?  How does one measure the impact on the environment?  Many of 
the broad principals offered in the various definitions by U.S. government entities, such 
as affordability, abundance, and the environment are incompatible with one another.  For 
example, an energy source such as oil might be abundant, yet it may also be a leading 
contributor of greenhouse gasses and climate change.  The U.S. Congress may push for 
an energy policy that is favorable for an abundant source of dirty energy, but that may 
conflict with another energy policy objective, such as the State Department’s mission of 
“ever-cleaner” sources of energy.  It may also be incompatible with itself, as an abundant 
or affordable energy might have a detrimental impact on the environment.  How then do 
                                                          
23
 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Energy Resources, http://www.state.gov/e/enr/. 
24
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, DC: 2010): 87. 
25
 Sovacool, Defining, Measuring, and Exploring Energy Security, 3. 
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you define, measure and reconcile a multifaceted concept that has implications for many 
different policy areas?   
One innovative approach has been developed by Jonathan Elkind, a former 
assistant secretary at the U.S. Department of Energy.  Elkind asserts that energy security 
is composed of four components: availability, reliability, affordability, and 
sustainability.
26
  What makes Elkind’s method innovative is that the four components to 
his concept correspond to threats posed to energy security.  This allows for the concept of 
‘energy security’ to cut across different interconnected policy areas, from energy 
production to consumption, while allowing the concept to remain meaningful.  Like 
Elkind, Sovacool and Brown also believe in a four-part concept of energy security.  
Sovacool and Brown’s concept of energy security closely mirrors that of Elkind, and 




Sovacool and Brown point out the need for taking a holistic approach when 
dealing with energy security, as when a country pursues one dimension of security, it 
often comes at the expense of the other three.
28
  As the literature review has 
demonstrated, it will be necessary for the U.S. to first offer a single, coherent definition 
and concept of ‘energy security’ for U.S. energy policy to be successful, and prevent 
special interests from formulating energy policy to the detriment of other U.S. energy 
policy objectives.  The KXL pipeline is illustrative of an inherent policy conflict as a 
                                                          
26
 Sovacool, Defining, Measuring, and Exploring Energy Security, 8. 
27
 Benjamin Sovacool and Marilyn Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International 
Perspective,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 35 (2010): 81. 
28
 Ibid. 85. 
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result of a lack of clarity of what exactly increases U.S. energy security.  The case study 
presented in this chapter will examine the conflict between differing concepts between 
competing U.S. government institutions of the term, the special interest that is behind the 
KXL, and the policy gridlock that is the result.  For the purposes of my research, this 
paper examines the KXL pipeline as a case study using Sovacool and Brown’s 
dimensions of energy security to identify the effects the pipeline will have on U.S. energy 
security, in order to identify and measure TransCanada’s claim that the pipeline will 
increase U.S. energy security.  The case study will also serve as a test concept for a U.S. 
concept for ‘energy security’ through which energy proposals could be examined and 
measured to gauge whether or not a policy will increase U.S. energy security.   
 
Case Study:  The Keystone XL Pipeline 
Introduction 
The following case study contains four sections, one section for each of Sovacool 
and Brown’s dimensions of energy security including availability, affordability, energy 
and economic efficiency, and environmental stewardship.  Each dimension will be 
measured by an indicator of energy security appropriate for that criterion of energy 
security.  Following each section of analysis will be a brief conclusion, summarizing each 
section’s finding of the effect that the KXL pipeline will have on the particular dimension 






 Availability, in terms of energy security, is associated with procuring a sufficient 
and uninterrupted supply, and minimizing foreign dependency on fuels.
29
  Historically, 
there is a high cost associated with foreign dependency.  The best-known example of the 
high cost of foreign dependence on foreign oil for the U.S. was the OPEC embargo 
during the 1970s.  The embargo drastically cut supplies of oil to the U.S., thus resulting 
in high gas prices and rationing of gas.  Energy suppliers from Russia to Venezuela have 
increasingly been willing to use energy resources as a tool to accomplish strategic and 
political objectives. Energy importing nations are finding that high dependence on 
foreign energy increases strategic vulnerability, while simultaneously constraining the 
ability to pursue broad foreign policy objectives.
30
  Both of these examples illustrate the 
definition of ‘availability’ and its importance to energy security – uninterrupted supply 
and minimal foreign dependency.   
An important aspect of availability is ‘diversification’.  Through diversification, a 
nation can attain a sufficient supply of energy to avoid a possible disruption with one 
source of energy, while minimizing dependence on any single nation as the source of its 
energy supply.  From diversification, it is thought that it could then be possible to avoid 
the crippling effects of an embargo, as experienced in the 1970s, and to avoid having 
your energy needs used as a weapon against you, as Russia has done in Europe.   
                                                          
29
 Sovacool and Brown, Competing Dimensions of Energy Security, 81. 
30
 Council on Foreign Relations, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency, (New York: 
November 2006): 3. 
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According to Sovacool and Brown, diversification encompasses three dimensions: 
source diversification, supplier diversification, and spatial diversification.
31
  Source 
diversification includes using different energy sources and fuel types; supplier 
diversification refers to the need to develop multiple points of energy production; and 
spatial diversification refers to the location of energy producing infrastructure and 
facilities.
32
  Key indicators for energy security involving availability include oil import 




 Source diversification is the utilization of many different energy sources to 
provide energy services.  Energy sources can include fossil fuels such as petroleum and 
coal, nuclear; renewable energy sources including wind, solar and biofuel; and natural 
gas.  Currently, the U.S. energy portfolio is made up from (in descending order, from 
largest to smallest) petroleum at 36%, natural gas at 25%, coal at 20%, renewable sources 
at 9%, and nuclear at 8%.
34
  In terms of energy consumption by sector, electric power is 
the largest at 41%, followed by transportation at 28%, industrial at 21%, and residential 
and commercial at 11%.
35
  Despite electric power being the largest sector for energy 
consumption in the U.S. as a percent of total energy use, the sector uses no petroleum.  
Instead, the sector constituting the largest amount of U.S. energy consumption derives its 
energy from a mix of sources, including coal, nuclear, natural gas, and renewable 
                                                          
31




 Ibid. 87. 
34
 Branko Terzic, “Energy Independence and Security: A Reality Check,” Deloitte University Press, 2012: 
16. 
35
 Ibid. 5. 
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sources.  The transportation sector, on the other hand, is almost entirely supported by 
petroleum, with 93% of the sector’s total energy use coming from petroleum.
36
  In terms 
of availability, this is an indicator of energy security that needs to be improved.   
 The KXL pipeline then, with its promise to deliver more than 830,000 barrels of 
oil per day (bpd) to the U.S., would only serve to increase the largest energy source 
within the U.S. energy portfolio, petroleum.  Additionally, the supply of petroleum from 
the KXL pipeline would provide more petroleum for consumption by the transportation 
sector.  At 93% of the energy source used for transportation, this would only increase the 
risk to energy security by providing a cheap and reliable source of energy, giving little 
incentive to diversify the energy sources used to fuel the transportation sector.  Despite 
U.S. energy coming from a variety of sources, over reliance on petroleum in the 
transportation sector, coupled with the lack of diversification efforts, makes the KXL 
pipeline the wrong infrastructure project in the effort aimed at source diversification.    
 
Supplier Diversification 
 Supplier diversification is the effort to develop multiple sources of energy 
suppliers to minimize dependence on any single supplier or foreign nation for oil.  An 
indication of a nation’s supplier diversity is measured by its oil import dependency.  
Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. supply portfolio is quite diverse, as the U.S. imports 
petroleum products from more than 80 nations.
37
  Additionally, the U.S. imports less than 








half of the petroleum it consumes - 45%, while the remaining 55% of the petroleum 
consumed in the U.S. is domestically produced.
38
  
 TransCanada has asserted in its Presidential Permit Application that it will be in 
the ‘national interest’ of the U.S. to allow the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, 
as the pipeline would allow for the U.S. to reduce its reliance on crude oil from 
Venezuela and Mexico in particular, and the Middle East and Africa in general.  
TransCanada asserts that Canadian oil is ‘secure and reliable,’ while crude oil from 
Venezuela, Mexico, etc. is neither secure nor reliable.  Taken together, this implies that 
the KXL pipeline will help reduce U.S. oil import dependency.  In the absence of a 
concept for ‘energy security’, it makes the claim from the special interest, TransCanada 
in this case, difficult to disprove.  However, if the goal of supplier diversification is to 
increase the number of suppliers that supply the U.S. with petroleum, then the KXL 
pipeline would fail in this regard.  Currently, of the 45% of petroleum the U.S. imports, 
25% comes from Canada.
39
  That is, Canada is already the largest supplier of petroleum 
to the U.S.  Further, it is unclear why TransCanada labeled Mexican oil as unsecure and 
unreliable.  The government of Mexico is democratic and not hostile to the U.S. as 
opposed to other countries the U.S. imports oil from, namely Venezuela.  Despite 
violence related to drug cartels in Mexico, this has not caused a disruption in Mexican 
crude oil output.  Mexican crude oil is considered a secure source of supply, as Mexico 
supplies the U.S. with 12% of the petroleum it imports.
40
      
                                                          
38







 Despite TransCanada’s claims that the KXL pipeline will allow the U.S. to reduce 
its dependence on foreign oil from such places as the Middle East and Africa, the process 
of substituting petroleum from one country with petroleum from another country is not as 
straightforward as TransCanada would have one believe.  There are many different types 
of crude oil produced around the world, as crude oil produced in different geographical 
locations will have its own unique properties.  In general crude oil has been grouped into 
4 main classes (Very Light, Light, Medium, and Heavy) based on certain quality 
characteristics, the most important being density and sulfur content.  Crude oil that is 
light, i.e. a low density, and sweet, i.e. low sulfur content, are the most desirable due to 
the fact that light sweet crude oil can be produced far cheaper and with less energy-
intensive refining processes than heavy, sour crude oils.
41
   
 The markets with the refining capacity to process heavy crude are therefore 
limited, based on the complex processes and equipment, along with the more energy-
intensive refining.  The proposed KXL pipeline will carry Canadian heavy crude oil to 
the U.S.  Other countries that the U.S. imports heavy crude from include Venezuela and 
Mexico, two countries that TransCanada specifically mentioned in its application.  Both 
Venezuela and Mexico are important oil suppliers to the U.S., supplying 10% and 12% 
respectively, of the oil the U.S. imports.  The only other countries that supply more oil to 
the U.S. are Canada and Saudi Arabia.  Since refining capacity for heavy crude is limited, 
the decision to allow the KXL pipeline will likely displace the crude oil currently 
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imported from both Venezuela and Mexico, as they also supply the U.S. with heavy 
crude.   
Other suppliers of crude oil that TransCanada mentions in its application, from 
the Middle East and Africa are unlikely to be affected, as they do not supply the U.S. 
with heavy crude.  Countries such as Saudi Arabia (which is the second largest source of 
U.S. petroleum imports at 13%), Iraq (5%), Nigeria (9%), and Angola (4%) do not 
produce heavy crude.
42
  Instead, those countries produce the light, sweet crude that is 
desirable because of its quality.  Construction of the KXL pipeline then will have little to 
no effect on U.S. dependency of oil imports from countries in the Middle East or Africa.  
Moreover, despite any misgivings regarding the governments of Venezuela and Mexico 
one has, one cannot argue that either country’s oil has been unsecure or unreliable for the 
U.S.  Both countries have long been reliable suppliers of crude oil to the U.S., and will 
continue to be so for the foreseeable future at current rates of importation.   
The largest misconception about the KXL pipeline however, is the belief that the 
heavy Canadian crude oil it will carry to the U.S. is actually intended for U.S. 
consumption.  During a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
Commerce hearing on December 2, 2011 regarding the KXL pipeline, Congressman Ed 
Markey (D-MA) pressed TransCanada executive Alex Pourbaix to support legislation 
guaranteeing oil from the KXL pipeline would not be for foreign export once refined in 
the U.S.  In response, Mr. Pourbaix asserted that TransCanada was only shipping the oil, 
and could not guarantee the crude shipped through the pipeline would be used to reduce 
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U.S. crude imports from elsewhere.
43
  If the crude oil that is to be brought to the U.S. 
from Canada via the KXL pipeline is not meant for the U.S. market, then the pipeline 
would fail to have a positive effect on U.S. efforts to diversify its supplier portfolio.  
Further, it significantly raises questions about the claims TransCanada has made in its 
Presidential Permit Application regarding the benefits to U.S. energy security from the 
construction of the KXL pipeline, including the claim to reduce U.S. consumption of oil 




 Spatial diversification refers to the dispersing of critical infrastructure, so that no 
single terrorist attack, event, or failure can have a disruptive effect on a nation’s energy 
supply.  Energy infrastructure is equally as vulnerable as other critical types of 
infrastructure.
45
  Pipelines in particular often cover long, sparsely populated distances, 
and are often time consuming and expensive to repair if damaged.
46
  In the case of the 
KXL pipeline, this is of particular importance.   
 When completed, the KXL pipeline will be a 1,179 mile (1,897 km) long pipeline, 
making it not only one of the longest pipelines carrying oil in the U.S., but also one of the 
longest in the world.  Additionally, the KXL pipeline will be one of the largest pipelines 
in the U.S. by capacity, carrying 830,000 bpd.  Information about the planned pipeline is 
well disseminated throughout the Internet, and includes not only engineering information 
pertaining to the pipeline itself, but also detailed maps showing exactly where the 
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pipeline will be laid.  This would make it an attractive target to either acts of terrorism or 
sabotage. 
 Also of importance in regards to spatial diversification is where the pipeline ends, 
at Port Arthur, Texas.  This is important due to the fact that the largest refinery by 
capacity is located in Port Arthur.  In 2012, the refinery was upgraded, and now has a 
capacity to refine 600,250 bpd.  The combination of the one of the largest oil pipelines in 
the nation with the largest refinery in the U.S. should be considered a high-value target 
for acts of terrorism or sabotage.  Instead of making the goal spatial diversification, the 
U.S. will instead have provided a target that can greatly damage U.S. energy supply by 
grouping critical infrastructure together.   
 History provides a clear example of the possible acts of terrorism or sabotage 
aimed at critical infrastructure, specifically energy-related infrastructure.  Such acts have 
occurred both in North America and throughout the world.  In 1975, the New World 
Liberation Front sabotaged pipelines from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company in 
California.
47
  While such acts are rare in the North America, the U.S. is not immune to 
such acts of sabotage aimed at critical energy infrastructure.  More often, terrorist acts 
aimed at energy infrastructure occur overseas.  For the sake of brevity, only a few 
demonstrative examples will be listed.   
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In January 2013, an Islamist terror group infiltrated an Algerian gas plant at In 
Amenas, killing dozens of hostages and destroyed critical infrastructure.
48
  Attacks 
against energy infrastructure have turned to cyberspace, representing another possible 
vulnerability to critical infrastructure.  Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s largest oil 
company, suffered a cyberattack that damaged 3,000 computers, and was aimed at 
stopping oil and gas production.
49
  This same vulnerability may also exist with the KXL 
pipeline and Port Arthur refinery infrastructure.  The KXL pipeline will have no effect in 
assisting the U.S. at spatial diversification.  Instead, the pipeline will increase the value of 
itself as a high-value target for acts of terrorism or sabotage.        
Measuring the KXL pipeline by Congressional proclamations of ‘energy 
independence’ and ‘energy security’ make the project sound attractive.  The special 
interest driving the KXL policy proclaims that it will cut U.S. oil imports from hostile 
nations, and is from a friendly and reliable country, Canada.  If one had a checklist, it 
would appear that the KXL pipeline would meet critical criteria, according to the U.S. 
Congress, of what it takes to improve U.S. energy security.  TransCanada, for its part, has 
relied heavily on this perception in attempts at lobbying Congress and the State 
Department to approve the pipeline.  However, as this analysis shows, there is little that 
the KXL pipeline will do in terms of improving U.S. energy security in the dimension of 
availability.  Instead, a lack of conceptualization on the part of U.S. energy policy has 
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allowed a special interest to promote a policy that is not conducive with U.S. energy 
policy goals.      
Affordability 
 The second component of energy security according to Sovacool and Brown is 
‘affordability.’  Affordability is defined as providing energy that is affordable for 
consumers and minimizes price volatility.  The authors note that there are two additional 
dimensions to affordability, they include price stability and quality.  The focus of this 
analysis will be on the two dimensions of affordability and price stability.  The indicator 
for affordability as energy security is retail gasoline prices.  In June 2010, TransCanada 
directly declared via a study that the construction of the pipeline would lead to lower 
supply costs, and thus put downward pressure on gas prices that Americans pay at the 
pump.
50
  Even U.S. politicians declared that the KXL pipeline would help bring down 
prices Americans pay at the pump.
51
 Affordability is not only important for 
transportation, but can also indirectly increase the costs of other goods and services, as 
energy is responsible for up to 15% of the total cost of processing and production of 
goods.
52
  Affordability is a key dimension to energy security, and TransCanada has stated 
that the KXL pipeline will lower gasoline prices, and thus make its crude oil more 
affordable for U.S. consumers.        
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 According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, there are several factors that 
determine the price of oil.  There is no single factor that determines the price of oil.  
Factors include supply, geopolitics, weather, demand, and market behavior, among 
others.
53
  Additionally, because oil is a globally traded commodity, prices depend on how 
much is produced worldwide, not in any single nation.
54
  Despite Canada increasing its 
oil production, and shipping its oil via the KXL pipeline to the U.S., other producing 
nations may simply decrease their production, thus cancelling out any drop in price that 
increased production may have yielded to the global supply of oil.
55
  While U.S. 
consumption of oil is declining (At the end of 2013 China surpassed the U.S. as the 
largest net importer of petroleum), crude oil prices have continued to increase, reflecting 
increased global demand for crude oil, largely from strong economic growth in non-
OECD nations such as China and India.
56
   
 More specifically then, what effect will the KXL pipeline have on U.S. gas prices, 
in the short-term and long-term?  This is one of the most contentious points of debate 
about the KXL pipeline.  Proponents of the pipeline argue that it will not have an effect 
on U.S. gasoline prices, while opponents of the pipeline claim that it will increase U.S. 
gasoline prices in the Midwest by diverting oil for refining to the Gulf Coast.  Before 
declaring in 2010 that the pipeline would lower gas prices in the U.S., TransCanada 
officials in 2009 admitted that the KXL pipeline would actually increase the price of 
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crude oil in the U.S., not decrease prices.  It is important to examine the previous claim of 
the pipeline actually increasing oil prices in the U.S., as it directly affects the 
affordability dimension.  For the more obvious reasons, TransCanada’s declaration of 
downward pressure in gas prices in the U.S. can be explained from a populist perspective, 
and is therefore less relevant than their previous statements to the contrary. 
 In September 2009, executives of TransCanada testified before the Canadian 
National Energy Board.  In their testimony, the TransCanada executives claimed that the 
KXL pipeline would allow the end of discounting Canadian crude currently shipped to 
the U.S. Midwest for refining.
57
  Currently, the Midwest refining market is suffering from 
over-supply of Canadian crude as a result of rising oil production from Canada, combined 
with limited southbound pipe capacity.
58
  The result of this market imbalance has been a 
discount for refiners of Canadian crude that serve the 14 state Midwest market.  The KXL 
pipeline would then correct this market imbalance, and would allow the oversupply of 
Canadian crude to be shipped to the Gulf Coast.  The result of the correction of this 
market imbalance would be an increase in the price of gas that U.S. consumers pay in the 
Midwest.  It has been estimated that this market correction will increase the cost of gas 
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 As a part of affordability, energy prices should also be stable and minimal in price 
volatility.  Consumers in the U.S. are aware of the volatility in the price of oil.  Even 
reductions in oil imports will not shield U.S. consumers from the global market price of 
oil.
60
  It is therefore difficult to argue that the KXL pipeline, while increasing the U.S. 
import of oil, would act as a shield against future price fluctuations in oil in the long-
term.  Most of the volatility in the price of oil is the result of geopolitical instability, 
which can easily increase the price of oil from uncertainty in the market.   
 Two recent examples are illustrative of the disrupting and far-reaching effect that 
geopolitical instability can have on the price of oil, despite the U.S. importing very little 
oil from the country involved in the geopolitical instability.  Libya produces 1.8m bbl/d 
of crude oil, and exports approximately 1.5m bbl/d, mainly to Europe.  Libyan oil 
production totals less than 1% of the roughly 86m bbl/d global oil market.
61
  The U.S. 
imported only 15k bbl/d of crude oil from Libya in 2011.
62
  Despite the limited amount of 
crude oil the U.S. imported from Libya, the geopolitical unrest in Libya during 2011 
caused U.S. gas prices to increase 33 cents in two-weeks, the second largest two-week 
increase in the history of the gasoline market.
63
  Similarly, Egypt produces a small 
percentage of the total global output, about 550,000k bbl/d.  Of Egypt’s crude oil 
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production, the U.S. imports only 31,000k bbl/d from Egypt.
64
  Like Libya two years ago, 
geopolitical unrest is threatening to increase the global price of crude oil, with the trickle 
down effect of increasing U.S. gasoline prices.  The rising tensions in Egypt have pushed 
U.S. crude prices to over $100 a barrel, the highest level in the past 14 months.
65
   
   Despite the short and long-term effects of the global supply and demand market 
on prices for crude oil, there are proponents that believe the KXL pipeline will increase 
the global supply of oil, and thus put downward pressure on crude oil prices.
66
  When the 
KXL pipeline reaches its maximum capacity, it will carry roughly 0.8m bbl/d of crude 
oil, slightly less than 1% of global demand.  Despite the increase in supply that the KXL 
pipeline would provide to the global market, it is unlikely to decrease the price of crude, 
as the world will continue to experience fluctuations in the price of crude oil.   
Despite TransCanada’s claim, the KXL pipeline will not lower consumer prices in 
the U.S.  No single new development of oil can prevent fluctuations in the price, and the 
KXL pipeline will not be the first new development to do so.  Instead, the pipeline project 
will have a marginal effect on the price of gasoline, and on the affordability of crude oil, 
in either the short or long-term.  The KXL pipeline cannot act as a shield to protect U.S. 
consumers from the volatility of oil prices.  As Yergin notes, there is only one oil market, 
and secession is not an option.
67
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Energy and Economic Efficiency 
 The third dimension to energy security according to Sovacool and Brown relates 
to energy efficiency.  Energy efficiency is defined as enabling the most economically 
efficient use of energy to perform a certain task by minimizing the units of resources per 
unit of output.
68
  Improving energy efficiency also includes substituting fuels, changing 
habits and preferences, or altering goods and services to demand less energy.
69
  
Improving energy efficiency therefore relates to the innovation, research, and 
development of new energy technology.  Indicators for energy efficiency can include 




 The KXL pipeline, as a piece of infrastructure, does not increase energy 
efficiency through innovation, research, or development.  The pipeline also fails to 
increase energy efficiency as related to the ability to influence and change energy habits 
and preferences.  Instead, the KXL pipeline would likely increase U.S. reliance on fossil 
fuels, if, according to TransCanada, the oil transported through the pipeline is destined 
for U.S. consumption, rather than alternative and substitute fuels, such as biofuels.  While 
the indicators of energy security for energy efficiency cannot be applied to a piece of 
infrastructure such as a pipeline, evaluating the KXL pipeline through the dimension of 
energy efficiency provides further insight into the effects that it will have on U.S. energy 
security.  By not improving either energy or economic efficiency, the KXL pipeline 
would fail in this dimension.   
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 The final dimension of energy security according to Sovacool and Brown is 
environmental stewardship, which relates to the importance of sustainability.  
Sustainability, in the traditional sense, embodied the notion of balancing current resource 
consumption with future resource requirements.
71
  In regards to energy security, a 
contemporary concept of sustainability includes pursuing three objectives: ensuring the 
harvest rates of renewable resources do not exceed regeneration rates; making sure that 
waste emissions do not exceed relevant assimilative capacities of ecosystems; and 
guaranteeing that nonrenewable resources are depleted only at a rate equal to the creation 
of renewable ones.
72
  The U.S. State Department, while not explicitly defining 
‘sustainability’, has included access, renewable energy, and efficiency as dimensions to 
sustainable energy.
73
  The dimensions used by State Department are quite different, and it 
is worth questioning in what context State Department is using ‘sustainability,’ as it 
appears to not be in relation to ‘energy security.’  The indicators for environmental 
stewardship include aggregate sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions.  Since the KXL pipeline will carry oil, this case study will focus on the CO2 
emissions that will result from the Canadian tar sand oil the pipeline is to bring to market.   
 The most significant aspect to environmental stewardship is climate change.  
Organizations such as the International Energy Agency have recognized the link between 
climate change and energy security, and changing energy use is a key piece of trying to 
                                                          
71




 U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/e/enr/c56885.htm. 
 
 31 
create any energy security policy.
74
  The threat posed to energy security by climate 
change has also been recognized by former U.S. defense secretaries, and of the need to 
reduce greenhouse gases in U.S. energy policy.
75
  Climate change acts as a “threat 
multiplier,” in addition to the challenges to energy security, it will also create instability 
and challenges in areas such as food, water, health, and weather patterns.
76
   
Climate change in particular will affect U.S. energy security, as climate change is 
seen primarily as a result from energy usage.  Broadly speaking, when environmental 
conditions deteriorate, necessary energy resources may become unavailable, and may 
create conflict between nations over the remaining energy resources.
77
  In particular, 
rising sea levels as a result of global warming will threaten U.S. energy infrastructure 
located along coasts.
78
  This includes the oil refineries along the Gulf Coast, and the KXL 
pipeline, which will terminate at the Gulf Coast.  Reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
therefore, is a critical component to any energy security policy going forward.  According 
to the latest figures available from the U.S. Energy Information Agency, in 2011, 
petroleum accounted for 36% of U.S. energy consumption, and 42% of energy-related 
CO2 emissions.
79
  Year over year, energy-related CO2 emissions by the U.S. decreased by 
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2.4%, to 5.471 billion metric tons.
80
  At this level, the U.S. ranks as the second largest 
contributor to CO2 emissions worldwide, behind only China.
81
    
 Any possible benefits to U.S. energy security from the increase in supply from 
Canadian oil must be weighed against the increase in CO2 emissions that would result 
from using more Canadian oil.  In June 2013, President Obama, during a speech at 
Georgetown University, stated that he would oppose the KXL pipeline if it would 
“significantly” increase greenhouse gas admissions.
82
  Therefore, the link between CO2 
emissions and approval for the pipeline is significant.   
The U.S. Department of State has the authority of approving the KXL pipeline, 
because the pipeline crosses an international border, thus giving State jurisdiction over 
the matter.  Part of State Department’s evaluation process includes an Environmental 
Impact Statement, which is being conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).  The Environmental Impact Statement covers many factors, the most relevant to 
this research being CO2 emissions from the oil that the pipeline will carry.  The State 
Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) defines a part of ‘energy security’ as 
“ever-cleaner sources” of energy.  While the EPA does not offer a definition or concept 
of ‘energy security,’ the EPA plays a critical role in energy policy in the U.S.  For the 
EPA, this means a focus on “clean energy.”  The mechanism that grants the EPA such 
authority is from the Clean Air Act, a measure passed by Congress that regulates and 
limits pollutants in the atmosphere, including CO2 emissions.     
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The U.S. Department of State Environmental Impact Statement examined the 
issue of greenhouse gas emissions and Canadian tar sand crude.  From the EPA, the study 
found that Canadian tar sand crude is more greenhouse gas intensive than other crude oil 
that it would displace in the U.S.
83
 Another study, conducted by the Congressional 
Research Service, estimated that Canadian tar sand crude had the second highest CO2 
emissions among oil imported into the U.S., second only behind Venezuelan crude.
84
  
While the studies varied in their methodology and data used, both studies demonstrate the 
expected increase in CO2 emissions from the KXL pipeline.  Based on the above studies, 
importing more Canadian oil is not sustainable for the environment or U.S. energy policy 
goals.  
The emphasis in this section was the focus of what the State Department 
conceptualizes as ‘energy security.’  The State Department, as well as the EPA, have 
placed more concern and focus on the environmental aspect of energy security than 
Congress has.  Other than increased CO2 emissions, part of the environmental concern 
also stems from the possible spill potential of pipelines.  The KXL pipeline passes 
through environmentally fragile zones, including the Ogallala Aquifer.  In 2013, an oil 
spill that went undetected from a pipeline in North Dakota leaked 865,000 gallons of oil, 
making it one of the largest inland oil spills in history.
85
  TransCanada has re-submitted 
the planned route of the pipeline in the hopes of mitigating environmental concerns, 
however, a decision is still pending authorization for the pipeline to go ahead.  Based on 
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these environmental impacts, the KXL pipeline would not have a positive effect on U.S. 
energy security in this dimension.  
Conclusion 
  This chapter sought to determine how the KXL pipeline would affect U.S. energy 
security.  The case study has found that despite previous beliefs in what the KXL pipeline 
would do for the U.S., many of the claims presented by TransCanada are false.  The KXL 
pipeline will do little to improve U.S. energy security.  The hypothesis at the beginning of 
this chapter inferred that the lack of a definition and conceptualization of ‘energy 
security’ has allowed special interests, in this case, TransCanada, to shape U.S. energy 
policy under the guise of ‘energy security’, and resulted in policy gridlock.  The case 
study presented in this chapter has highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. energy policy to 
special interests.  Without a defined concept of ‘energy security’, the U.S. cannot 
improve its energy security through cohesive and effective policy.  Instead, special 
interests will fill the conceptual void, and drive U.S. energy policy in a direction that is 
beneficial not to the U.S., but to the bottom line of the special interest.  
 The case study in this chapter also highlighted the contradictions in policy that 
can arise when different government agencies use different concepts of ‘energy security’ 
to define and pursue policy objectives to increase the energy security of the U.S.  While 
Congress is firm in its belief that the pipeline will increase U.S. energy security, from 
affordability, reliability, and diversification away from ‘hostile nations’ (despite the 
claims proven to be false in this case study), the State Department and EPA believe that 
the pipeline posses a threat to the U.S. environment and global climate change.  Because 
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concepts and definitions of what exactly ‘energy security’ is conflict, the result is policy 
gridlock – final approval from President Obama has not yet been given.  While a final 
decision on the pipeline is expected, it is likely that the President will approve of the 
pipeline, although from the analysis presented in this case study, it will not affect U.S. 
energy security in the way that the pipeline’s proponents or Congress believes.  This 
chapter has attempted to highlight the fact that regardless of whether or not the pipeline is 
approved, a cohesive U.S. concept and policy for energy security is lacking, and will 
continue to hamper future U.S. efforts at improving energy security through cohesive and 













Timeline of the Keystone XL Pipeline 
 
 
September 19, 2008 – TransCanada submits an application to the U.S. Department of State to 
construct the Keystone XL pipeline, an extension of the existing Keystone pipeline.  
 
2009 – Department of State conducts 20 scoping meetings in communities along the pipeline 
route and consults with federal and state agencies and Indian tribes.  
 
April 16, 2010 – Department of State issues its Draft Environmental Impact Statement. It opens a 
45-day comment period, which it extends for additional days.  
 
Summer 2010 – Department of State hosts 21 public comment meetings in communities along the 
pipeline route. When the public comment period is extended, additional meetings are held. Nearly 
1,800 verbal and written comments are received.  
 
October 15, 2010 – Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton is asked about approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and she says, “we are 
inclined to do so.”  
 
October 25, 2010 – The General Presidents of four international unions representing a total of 2.6 
million workers send a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging the Department of State 
to approve the Keystone XL pipeline project.  
 
December 7, 2010 – Department of State hosts a government-to-government meeting for Indian 
tribes and other consulting parties.  
 
January 2011 – TransCanada agrees to adopt 57 project-specific special conditions for design, 
construction, and operations of the Keystone XL pipeline. The conditions are developed by the 
Department of State and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; according 
to the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, these conditions would give the Keystone 
XL pipeline “a degree of safety over any other typically constructed domestic oil pipeline,” 
making it a truly state-of-the-art pipeline.  
 
April 15, 2011 – Department of State issues a Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement and opens another 45-day comment period. More than 280,000 comments are received.  
 
July 25, 2011 – The Obama administration issues a Statement of Administration Policy calling 
legislation related to the Keystone XL pipeline unnecessary, declaring, “the Department of State 
has been working diligently to complete the permit decision process for the Keystone XL pipeline 
and has publicly committed to reaching a decision before December 31, 2011."  
 
July 26, 2011 – U.S. House of Representatives approves H.R. 1938, the North American-Made 
Energy Security Act. The bill, authored by Rep. Lee Terry (R-NE), requires a decision on the 
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Keystone XL pipeline by November 1, 2011. The bill is approved with a strong bipartisan vote of 
279-147.  
 
August 26, 2011 – Department of State issues its Final Environmental Impact Statement and 
opens up a 90-day review period. The agency continues accepting public comments.  
 
Fall 2011 – Department of State hosts public meetings in states along the pipeline route.  
 
November 10, 2011 – President Obama announces that no decision on the Keystone XL pipeline 
will be made until after the 2012 election. A decision is expected in early 2013, after the 
administration identifies a new route for the pipeline.  
 
November 10, 2011 – The president’s decision is widely attributed to political pressure exerted 
by environmentalist groups opposed to the pipeline. A statement from Terry O’Sullivan, General 
President of the Laborers’ International Union of North America, sums up the response: 
“Environmentalists formed a circle around the White House and within days the Obama 
administration chose to inflict a potentially fatal delay to a project that is not just a pipeline, but is 
a lifeline for thousands of desperate working men and women. The administration chose to 
support environmentalists over jobs – job-killers win, American workers lose.”  
 
December 23, 2011 – Both the House and Senate unanimously approve – and President Obama 
signs into law – a bill requiring approval of the Keystone XL pipeline within 60 days unless the 
president determines the project does not serve the national interest.  
 
January 18, 2012 – After over three years of review, President Obama formally rejects the 
pipeline's Presidential Permit and asks TransCanada to reapply.  
 
February 7, 2012 – The Energy and Commerce Committee approves H.R. 3548, the North 
American Energy Access Act. The bill, authored by Rep. Lee Terry (R-NE), removes the 
president's authority over the pipeline's permit and transfers it to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission.  
 
February 16, 2012 – U.S. House of Representatives approves the PIONEERS Act with language 
from Rep. Terry's bill requiring swift approval of the pipeline.  
 
March 8, 2012 – President Obama personally lobbies the Senate to kill an amendment calling for 
congressional approval of the Keystone XL pipeline. In spite of the president's efforts, 11 Senate 
Democrats joined all voting Republicans in favor of the project.  
 
March 22, 2012 – On a visit to Cushing, Oklahoma, President Obama takes undue credit for the 
southern leg of the pipeline from Cushing to the Gulf Coast, ignoring the fact that he rejected the 
only Keystone permit that requires his approval because it crosses our national boundary with 
Canada.  
 
April 18, 2012 – House approves H.R. 4348, the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2012, 
including language authored by Rep. Lee Terry (R-NE) taking the pipeline out of the president’s 
hands and requiring the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to approve the permit within 30 




April 18, 2012 – TransCanada submits a reroute of the Keystone XL plan to the state of Nebraska 
for review.  
 
May 4, 2012 – TransCanada reapplies to U.S. State Department for a Presidential Permit.  
 
May 18, 2012 – House passes a Motion to Instruct Conferees on H.R. 4348 to insist on Title II of 
the House bill regarding approval of the Keystone XL Pipeline. The motion passed with a 
bipartisan vote of 261-152.  
 
June 15, 2012 – State Department publishes Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Supplemental 
EIS (SEIS) for the second Keystone XL Presidential Permit application.  
 
January 22, 2013 – Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman gives approval of the proposed reroute of 
the pipeline through the Cornhusker State. March 1, 2013 – The U.S. State Department issued its 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Presidential Permit 
application, which includes the proposed new route through Nebraska. The SEIS findings are 
similar to the Department’s FEIS issued last August, which found the pipeline will have limited 
adverse environmental impacts.  
 
March 15, 2013 – H.R. 3, the Northern Route Approval Act, is introduced in the House by Rep. 
Lee Terry (R-NE). The bill addresses all the permits necessary beyond just presidential approval 
and would limit litigation that could doom the project.  
 
March 22, 2013 – U.S. Senate agrees to Sen. John Hoeven’s (R-ND) budget amendment urging 
approval of the Keystone XL pipeline by a vote of 62-37. 17 Democrats joined every Senate 
Republican voting in favor of the amendment, signaling future filibuster-proof support for 
legislation to build the pipeline using congressional authority. April 17, 2013 – The Energy and 
Commerce Committee approves H.R. 3, the Northern Route Approval Act, by a vote of 30 to 18.  
 
May 22, 2013 – House approves H.R. 3, the Northern Route Approval Act, with bipartisan 
support by a vote of 241 to 175.  
 
January 31, 2014 – The U.S. State Department issued its Final Supplemental Environmental 
Impact Statement for the permit application, confirming the project is safe and will have limited 
environmental impacts. The report reflects that TransCanada has agreed to incorporate 59 special 
safety conditions recommended by PHMSA.   
 
April 18, 2014 – The U.S. State Department announced it will delay the national interest 
determination period indefinitely, citing a need to wait until the Nebraska Supreme Court can rule 
over the route.   
 
September 18, 2014 – House approves H.R. 2, the American Energy Solutions for Lower Costs 
and More American Jobs Act, a broad energy package that includes the language of H.R. 3.  
 
November 14, 2014 – House approves H.R. 5682, a bill authored by Rep. Bill Cassidy (R-LA), 
which would approve the application for the Keystone XL pipeline.  
 
January 9, 2015 – House approves H.R. 3, the Keystone XL Pipeline Act, authored by Rep. Kevin 




January 29, 2015 –  Senate approves S.1, the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act. February 11, 
2015 –  House approves S.1, the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, sending the bill approving 
the pipeline to the president's desk.   
 
February 24, 2015 – President Obama vetoes S.1, the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act. 
 















Chapter 2:  Why Does Congress Have Difficulty Supporting The 
Department of Defense’s Operational Energy Strategy? 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 1 examined the effects of the Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL) on U.S. 
energy security.  Chapter 1 set out to examine the effects of the KXL pipeline on U.S. 
energy security, but the analysis led to a surprising outcome – there is no clear definition 
of ‘energy security’ being used by the U.S. government to measure any benefit the KXL 
pipeline would have on U.S. energy security.  The examination found that the two entities 
with oversight of the KXL pipeline, the U.S. Congress and U.S. Department of State, 
were using different language and concepts of what they believed ‘energy security’ 
meant.  The chapter concluded that U.S. energy policy lacks cohesiveness and 
comprehensiveness, and without a conceptual framework allows special interests, such as 
the company behind the KXL, to claim energy-related projects increase the energy 
security of the U.S.  The lack of such a definition or framework to guide energy policy 
also results in policy gridlock, as evidenced by the inability to approve or disapprove of 
the KXL pipeline after 5 years of debate. 
 In sharp contrast to both Congress and the State Department, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) has defined ‘energy security’ and has put forth an energy strategy to 
guide the Department of Defense in reducing its energy consumption.  This is not a 





  The Department of Defense is also the largest user of energy in the federal 
government. 
Figure 1.  U.S. Department of Defense Energy Consumption 
 
Source: Energy Information Agency 
Despite defining ‘energy security’ as well as having a strategy to reduce the 
department’s energy consumption, not all concerned are on board with DOD’s energy 
strategy; more specifically, Congress.  Congress’ authority over budgeting assures that if 
Congress disagrees with a component of any DOD budget request, it will not get funded.  
In the case of DOD’s energy strategy, Congress has specifically targeted the department’s 
research and funding into biofuels for cuts.       
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 In keeping with the theme of this thesis portfolio, Chapter 2 will explore why 
Congress has targeted DOD’s biofuels program for cuts, when biofuels are a central 
component to DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy.  Congress’ views on biofuels are 
significant, considering the potential they have to reduce U.S. consumption of petroleum.  
The answer to this question will help establish the validity of Chapter 2’s hypothesis, 
which is that Congress’ lack of a cohesive definition or concept of ‘energy security’ has 
led it into conflict with DOD, an organization that has defined and conceptualized the 
term ‘energy security’.  The lack of a clear definition or conceptualization of ‘energy 
security’ is a problem throughout the U.S. government, and as a result may be hindering 
the development and implementation of a cohesive energy policy to address U.S. energy 
security needs.  Just as the failure to define and conceptualize ‘energy security’ allowed 
special interests to define U.S. energy policy, such as the KXL pipeline, a failure to 
define and conceptualize the term has allowed narrow political interests to define energy 
policy.   
 This chapter begins with a brief reintroduction of the term ‘energy security’, and a 
recap of how both Congress and DOD define ‘energy security’.  Second, a literature 
review is conducted on DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy.  This is necessary to assess 
how well DOD’s definition of ‘energy security’ is aligned with the department’s energy 
strategy.  A discussion of how language can be problematic for government branches and 
agencies will also be included.  Third, after the literature review, an analysis of why 
alternative fuels are important to DOD’s energy strategy, as well as Congressional action 
and statements regarding alternative fuels will be examined, setting up the 
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aforementioned hypothesis to be tested.  Lastly, a conclusion will be offered, 
summarizing Chapter 2’s findings.  This is offered as part of an effort to determine 
whether or not the lack of a comprehensive and cohesive definition of ‘energy security’ is 
affecting the ability of the U.S. to increase its energy security through effective energy 
policies.   
 
Literature Review 
Part I: Brief Reintroduction of Energy Security   
  In Chapter 1, the term ‘energy security’ is examined.  Multiple meanings of the 
term were found, even within U.S. policy.  Unsurprisingly, there is little agreement 
within the academic community of how ‘energy security’ should be defined, or if it 
should even be defined in the first place.  When the term is defined, it is reflective of a 
nation’s unique energy needs and resources.  The U.S. has yet to define this term, despite 
the growing importance of energy, as reflected in the political rhetoric regarding U.S. 
energy independence and security as a result of the increase in U.S. energy production 
that has allowed the U.S. to become one of the world’s leading producers of oil and gas.  
One hypothesis of this thesis portfolio posits that without a comprehensive and coherent 
definition of the term, U.S. energy policy will be ineffective at increasing U.S. energy 
security.  Therefore, from a policy perspective, it is important to have a definition and 
concept of the term from which an effective policy can be drawn from. 
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   Despite the lack of any coherent definition of the term from the highest levels of 
the U.S. government, including the Department of Energy, DOD has taken the initiative 
on the critical issue of energy security.  As outlined in the QDR released in 2010, DOD 
defines ‘energy security’ as “having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the 
ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.”
87
  As this 
chapter will demonstrate, an effective energy policy begins with a cohesive definition of 
the term, as DOD has done.  In sharp contrast to DOD, the U.S. Congress has never 
defined or conceptualized the term, despite passing several pieces of legislation since the 
1970s pertaining to U.S. energy independence and security.
88
  It is hard to imagine 
legislation that has a coherent understanding of energy without first defining and 
conceptualizing the issue first.  This chapter posits that as a result of differences in 
defining the term, narrow political interests have been allowed to define ‘energy security’ 
for the U.S. Congress, and policy gridlock has ensued as a result.  
Part II: What is DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy? 
 In 2010, the Department released the fourth QDR, and for the first time, identified 
energy security as critical to national security.  For this reason, the QDR defined the term 
‘energy security’.  Following the release of the QDR, in 2011 the Department released 
the inaugural Operational Energy Strategy, the first time the Department has attempted to 
transform the way the U.S. military thinks about and consumes energy.  The Strategy 
document is intended to give the various U.S. military branches a common direction and 
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goal, while providing overarching guidance on reducing their energy demand and 
improving energy security.  As a result, the Operational Energy Strategy carefully aligns 
with the goals outlined by the 2010 QDR.   
 The strategy document makes clear the reason the military now needs to think 
about its energy consumption.  These reasons include rising military demand for energy, 
the vulnerability of fuel supplies to attack in conflicts, and the volatility of fuel prices due 
to rising competition globally for the same energy resources.
89
  In order to reduce these 
risks and vulnerabilities, the strategy outlines three principal ways for the military to 
reduce its energy consumption and improve its energy security. 
 First, the strategy highlights the need to reduce energy demand in military 
operations.  Of the three principals outlined in the document, this has been identified as 
DOD’s top priority.  A reduction in fuel demand has tactical, operational, and strategic 
benefits.  U.S. military operations require and consume large amounts of fuel, and 
military supply lines for fuel are both vulnerable to attack and costly.  Improved 
efficiency in military energy usage has the potential to reduce both risks and costs, and 
improve military missions whether they are humanitarian or combat in nature.  To 
achieve the desired reduction for demand in military operations, the strategy recommends 
a two front approach: investing in new energy efficient technologies, and modifying 
existing practices and behaviors.
90
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    Second, the strategy calls for the Department to expand its energy supply 
options.  The reliability of petroleum, DOD’s main energy source, is increasingly at risk.  
Relying on a single energy source such as petroleum has serious economic, strategic, and 
environmental risks.  These risk factors have been identified as the volatility of oil prices, 
the geopolitical effects of rising global demand for oil, the effects of first procuring and 
then transporting large supplies of fuel, and the damage caused to the environment.  
These factors can also empower nations hostile to the U.S., and increase price and 
political instability.  The effort to diversify DOD’s energy sources is second only behind 
the effort to reduce demand for energy.   
  The potential of alternative fuels has been identified by DOD as an important 
component to the future of the U.S. energy landscape.
91
  In order to develop the potential 
of alternative fuels, the Strategy document calls for continued investment in the Research, 
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) of alternative fuels.  The investment in 
alternative fuels must be supported by four criteria coving both economic and technical 
feasibility: alternative fuels must be “drop in” (compatible with current equipment), must 
be able to support a globally deployed force, consider the potential for upstream and 
downstream consequences (i.e. higher food prices), and the lifecycle of greenhouse gas 
emissions must be less than or equal to emissions from conventional fuel.
92
  Additionally, 
the Department states that it will acquire alternative fuels at prices that are competitive 
with conventional fuels.  This has proved to be a problem for the Department, and will be 
explored in this chapter at length. 
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 Finally, the third principal the Strategy document articulates is more energy 
capability.  Energy itself is an important capability, and going forward, should be an 
important consideration in U.S. force structure and strategy.  Currently, the U.S. military 
is structured and equipped to use large amounts of energy, and oil in particular.  The 
challenges of supplying fuel are currently not a strategic consideration taken into account.  
Integrating energy considerations will mean making tradeoffs in the equipping and 
deployment of forces in the future, which will in turn help DOD meet its strategic goals.   
 The importance of biofuels to the DOD energy strategy is so important that the 
individual services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) have included the increased 
use of biofuels in each of the individual services’ energy visions.  For instance, the Army 
and Marine Corps have both included “increased use of renewable/alternative energy” in 
their respective energy visions, while the Navy has made “Green the Footprint” (of the 
fleet) a priority.
93
  Despite the differences of what the various services’ call their goal of 
using increased biofuels, their goal is the same – understanding that energy security is 
critical to both economic and national security.  Current reliance on fossil fuels represents 
a significant threat to not only the U.S. military, but also to the country as a whole.
94
  The 
ability of the U.S. to diversify energy resources and move away from fossil fuels will be a 
critical component of future U.S. energy security.
95
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Part III: How Language Causes Misunderstanding 
 A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from 2010 studied the 
problem of Federal agencies using different definitions and vocabulary.  What the GAO 
found was that using multiple definitions and different terminology creates confusion, 
and makes effective collaboration between Federal agencies more difficult.
96
  The GAO 
report also found that in the absence of a consistent definition and means of 
measurement, a term might mean or designate several different conditions, compounding 
the problem of interagency collaboration and policy effectiveness.
97
  In the report’s 
conclusion, the GAO noted that interagency coordination was more likely to occur 
between agencies that used a common definition and vocabulary.
98
  The report is 
illustrative of how the failure to conceptualize an issue can limit a policy’s effectiveness, 
and stymie efforts at interagency cooperation and coordination to address the same policy 
issue.  The same problem of conceptualization is currently affecting attempts at creating a 
coherent and cohesive U.S. energy policy, an issue that involves many government 
agencies, often with their own definitions or lack of a working definition, and vocabulary.         
 The importance of definitions and vocabulary in terms of ‘energy’ and ‘energy 
security’ is myriad.  The discussion in Chapter 1 of what ‘energy security’ means offered 
many differing definitions, with each definition offering a different means of how to 
measure security in terms of energy.  The GAO report supports the theory that in order to 
have an effective policy, it is first necessary to have a common definition of the issue, 
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and a common vocabulary used to measure and define the problem.  Without a common 
definition and vocabulary, a policy’s effectiveness will be affected, as will agency efforts 
at collaboration.  In terms of ‘energy security’, this is most acute due to the lack of 
agreement among the many agencies that deal with energy and energy policy of what the 
term ‘energy security’ means.  As previously noted, only DOD has defined the term 
‘energy security’.   
 The lack of a common definition and vocabulary for the term ‘energy security’ is 
not only limited to DOD and the U.S. Congress.  The problem is so widespread that in 
January 2014, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum ordering the 
undertaking of an inaugural Quadrennial Energy Review (QER).  The goal of the QER is 
to provide the U.S. with a “comprehensive and integrated energy strategy resulting from 
interagency dialogue and active engagement of external stakeholders.”
99
  The Presidential 
Memo acknowledges the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad role in the development 
of energy policy, while also acknowledging that there are several other Federal agencies 
and departments that also have a role in developing U.S. energy policy.   
In addition to laying out the reasons for ordering an inaugural QER, the 
Presidential Memo also lists the Federal agencies and branches that are to be included in 
the QER.  There are a total of twenty-two agencies and government branches listed to 
participate in the QER; most notably including DOD and the National Security Staff.
100
  
The inclusion of DOD and National Security Staff in the QER underscores the 
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importance that energy has in not only U.S. energy policy, but defense and national 
security policy as well.  However, with twenty-two government agencies and branches 
partaking in the QER, the importance of coming to an agreement on a meaningful 
definition of ‘energy security’ and related vocabulary is only magnified.  A lack of 
consensus on definitions and common vocabulary will only compound the problem of 
establishing a comprehensive and integrated energy strategy.               
A recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing during the 113
th
 Congress 
highlights the lack of a common vocabulary and its potential to affect the discussion of 
DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy.  The Senate hearing, titled “Posture of the 
Department of the Navy,” examined the Navy’s Defense Authorization Request for fiscal 
year 2015.  Included in the request was $170 million in funding for the Navy’s research 
into alternative fuels, in support of DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy.  During the 
hearing, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) asked the Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable 
Raymond E. Mabus Jr., why the Navy was spending money studying algae fuel, when the 
Defense Department was cutting the number of Marine battalions.  In response, Secretary 
Mabus noted that the funding was not for “algae fuel”, but for “alternative fuels.”
101
      
 The confusion over the term may seem minor, and may have been an attempt by 
the Senator to win political points motivated by narrow political interests.  However, it is 
an example that highlights the stark contrast two institutions, DOD and Congress, have 
developed toward energy security.  While DOD has developed definitions and vocabulary 
to conceptualize the issue, Congress has not, and the failure by Senator Cruz to 
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distinguish what “alternative fuels” comprise confirms that Congress’ inability to define 
‘energy security’ and common vocabulary is limiting the ability to establish a more 
cohesive and integrated national energy policy.  Statements and comments from Sen. 
Cruz during committee hearings undermine the seriousness and urgency of policy efforts 
to increase energy security not only for DOD, but also for the U.S. as a nation through a 
coherent and cohesive energy strategy aimed at reducing U.S. military reliance on fossil 
fuels.      
 The failure to conceptualize the issue of ‘energy security’ in Congress is not the 
result of a single politician.  Single politicians, such as Sen. Cruz, merely represent the 
failure to conceptualize the issue at the political level.  Both the Republican and 
Democratic platforms have failed to conceptualize and define the issue of ‘energy 
security’.  While the Republican National Committee (RNC) advocates for ‘energy 
independence’, the platform does not define or describe what U.S. energy independence 
is or how it is to be achieved.
102
  Curiously, the platform for ‘energy independence’ 
advocated by the RNC does not include alternative fuels.  This may help to explain the 
hostility to such alternative fuel programs, such as DOD’s, by Republican lawmakers.  
The Democratic National Committee (DNC) also touts ‘energy independence’ as its goal 
for U.S. energy policy.  However, much like the RNC, the DNC fails to define what 
‘energy independence’ is and how energy independence will be achieved.  The 
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Democratic platform does, however, include alternative fuels such as biofuels in its 
platform.
103
   
The competing party platforms for energy policy are more similar than dissimilar, 
in that each platform offered is vague on what ‘energy independence’ mean, and are not 
close to being meaningful or even marginally conceptualized policies.  The similarity in 
ambiguity is not a coincidence.  Grossman notes that the solution of ‘energy 
independence’ is politically popular because it could mean anything, take years to realize, 
and sounds decisive.
104
  For these reasons, any political interest can influence Congress 
by claiming to represent policy that helps the U.S. achieve ‘energy independence’, or 
oppose legislation that would affect their political interests.  In the case of DOD biofuels, 
the political interest opposing such legislation is the oil and gas lobby.  This will be 
discussed further in the coming sections. 
The affects of Congress’ inability to conceptualize the issue of ‘energy security’ 
are being felt first and foremost by DOD, which is currently trying to establish a cohesive 
and integrated energy policy.  Unless there is agreement in the future over definitions and 
common vocabulary, it is likely that such exchanges between politicians and civilian 
DOD leaders will continue to happen at Senate and House of Representatives hearings.  
Disputes over vocabulary may seem trivial, but have a large impact on policy.  The 
current conflict over language and vocabulary between DOD and Congress is 
jeopardizing DOD’s ability to achieve the reduction in energy consumption that DOD 
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believes to be vital to U.S. national security, by failing to conceptualize the issue of 
‘energy security’ and pass policies that are cohesive and continuous.    
 
Part IV: Why Alternative Fuels Are Important to DOD’s Energy Strategy  
 The link between DOD’s definition of ‘energy security’ and the Operational 
Energy Strategy comes from the need to reduce DOD’s dependence on oil.  More 
specifically, DOD wants to reduce its consumption of oil that is unreliable and 
unpredictable in price.  As defined in the 2010 QDR, key parts of the definition forming 
‘energy security’ include having “assured access” and “reliable supplies.”
105
  When the 
price of oil fluctuates and increases in price due to market volatility, its supply to the U.S. 
military is neither assured nor reliable.   
 Oil is the world’s ultimate, most important commodity.  It is traded globally, and 
is susceptible to price increases due to instability in countries and regions that produce 
oil.  This is often referred to as a “security premium.”  The security premium increases 
the price of oil by several dollars a barrel, often for several weeks.  Over the past few 
years, instability in the Middle East as a result of the Arab revolutions, and the ongoing 
conflict in Syria, have seen a security premium increase the cost of oil.  The world is very 
familiar with these fluctuations in the price of oil, because the same scenario plays out 
every time instability arises. 
 Despite the increase in the U.S. of domestic oil and gas, thanks in large part to the 
shale gas revolution, and the decreasing levels of oil the U.S. imports, energy is still a 
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security concern.  The U.S. is not immune from the market volatility of oil, even if it 
consumed all of the oil it produced and imported no foreign oil.  The global market sets 
the price of oil, and there is little the U.S. can do about it.  Oil is not only a national 
security vulnerability, it is also a military vulnerability.  As the world’s single largest 
organizational consumer of oil, the U.S. military is especially sensitive to the price of oil.  
 The implications for DOD over the increase in the price of oil are tremendous.  
Every $1 increase in the price of oil per barrel results in an extra $30 million the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps must pay.
106
  Like the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army and 
Air Force are also vulnerable to increases in the price of oil.  Recent spikes in the price of 
fossil fuels have squeezed the Services’ budgets, and have forced the Navy and Air Force 
to find funds to cover the shortfall. 
 Annually, DOD spends $15 billion on fossil fuels.
107
  In the fiscal years of 2011 
and 2012, market volatility in the price of oil added an additional $3 billion to the cost 
DOD had to pay for fuel.  The fiscal year of 2013 was no different.  Spikes in the price of 
oil left the Navy needing an additional $450 million to cover its fuel costs.
108
  The Air 
Force, the branch that consumes the most fossil fuel of the services, faced an unexpected 
fuel bill of $700 million.
109
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 The unexpected fuel bills that the services face every year are being compounded 
by DOD’s shrinking budgets.  The reduction in defense spending, known as 
“sequestration,” started in 2013.  The cuts, totaling $500 million over 10 years, are 
forcing the military into making difficult budget decisions affecting weapons programs, 
training, maintenance, and personnel.  Budget shortfalls resulting from having to pay the 
“security premium” for fossil fuel is forcing the various branches of the military to find 
the necessary funds, often forcing the military to curtail existing operations or to submit a 
reprogramming request moving funds from one program to another.  Combined with 
sequestration, the cost of fossil fuels are increasingly leaving the U.S. military with fewer 
resources to pay for other needs. 
         Because of new weapon platforms that are due to enter service in the coming years 
that consume more fuel than the platforms they replacing, including the F-35 fighter jet, 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and the new Air Force tanker, the KC-46A, DOD’s fuel 
demand is expected to rise by at least 10 percent by 2020.
110
  Against a backdrop of 
shrinking budgets and reprogramming to cover fuel costs, a military that uses more fuel is 
only increasing the vulnerability it faces from fluctuations in oil prices.  This has led 
DOD to increase efforts at increasing its own energy security, which in turn increases the 
security of the U.S.   
One way of increasing DOD’s energy security is to diversify its fuel supply.  
Alternative fuels have the potential to reduce fuel costs, while also mitigating DOD’s 
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exposure to volatile oil prices.  To achieve this reduction in consumption of fossil fuels 
and increase DOD’s energy security, each of the military services has set goals for 
alternative fuel use.           
Not all of the military services are ambitious, or have shown initiative by taking 
the lead in developing alternative fuel programs as some services. This may be due to a 
lack of political support, which will be addressed in the next section.  Of the three 
services, the Army has not set any specific target for using alternative fuels.  The Army 
does, however, have the broad goal of increasing the use of alternative and renewable 
fuels.111
 
 The Air Force, on the other hand, is more ambitious than the Army in setting 
goals for alternative fuel use.  This may be caused by the significant amounts of fuel the 
Air Force uses.  To increase the use of alternative fuel, the Air Force has set a goal to 
“cost-competitively acquire 50% of the Air Force’s domestic aviation fuel requirements 
via an alternative fuel blend.”
112
  The service that has shown the greatest ambition and 
initiative in alternative fuel development is the Navy.  In 2009, Secretary Mabus 
introduced five energy goals for the Department of the Navy.  The Secretary’s five 
energy goals for the Navy included:
 113
   
 Increase alternative energy sources afloat. By 2020, the department of navy aims 
to obtain 50% of the fleet’s liquid fuel from alternative sources.  
 Increase alternative energy sources ashore. By 2020, the department of the navy 
aims to produce at least 50% ashore-based energy requirements from alternative 
sources and plans that 50% of don installations will be net-zero with regards to 
energy usage.  
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 Demonstrate a Green strike Group in local operations by 2012 and deploy a 
“Great Green fleet” in 2016.  
 Reduce non-tactical commercial fleet petroleum use by 50% by 2015.  
 Require energy efficient acquisition in which the evaluation of energy factors will 
be mandatory when awarding systems and building contracts.  
 
The objective of setting such ambitious goals was first and foremost to increase the 
energy security of the Navy.  The goals outlined by Secretary Mabus also sought to 
increase the strategic independence of the service, while also improving the Navy’s 
warfighting capabilities.
114
  These goals are also in line with DOD’s definition of ‘energy 
security.’  Promoting domestic alternative fuels in the U.S. will free the U.S. military 
from the both the price volatility of oil that has cost DOD billions, and the potential lack 
of assured access to oil.  Alternative fuels will allow the military to have “assured access” 
and a “reliable supply” of energy.   
Reducing DOD’s fuel consumption is more than saving money from high fuel bills.  
Alternative fuels also represent a way to mitigate the U.S. military’s vulnerability to 
fossil fuel energy.  In addition to the “security premium” vulnerability that DOD pays for 
during times instability in sensitive countries and regions, supply lines have been and still 
are attractive targets for any force opposing the U.S. military.  Supply truck convoys 
carrying fuel are regularly targeted by Taliban in Afghanistan, which are often attacked 
and destroyed.  Using less fossil fuel would reduce this vulnerability.  
 There is also a human cost to fossil fuel dependence.  Protecting energy supplies 
is often a dangerous job, especially in Afghanistan.  Protecting fuel convoys has been 
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described as one of the most dangerous jobs in Afghanistan, with 1 casualty from every 
24 missions.
115
  The use of alternative fuels will allow DOD to reduce risk and 
vulnerability by reducing reliance on fossil fuels that have a high cost, in both dollars and 
human lives.  Making U.S. forces less vulnerable to risks from fossil fuels also makes 
them better warfighters, something that DOD continually improves upon.    
 In order to establish “assured access” and “reliable supplies” of alternative 
energy, under a 2011 presidential directive, the Department of the Navy joined with the 
Departments of Agriculture and Energy, to help promote a national biofuel industry.
116
  A 
national biofuel industry would provide the U.S. military with assured access and a 
reliable supply of alternative energy.  The goal of the initiative to start a domestic-based 
biofuels industry is to provide military-compatible biofuel at a price that is cost 
competitive with current fossil fuel prices.  Despite the many potential benefits that 
DOD’s Operational Energy Strategy offers to both national and military energy security, 
Congress has stymied the efforts aimed at increasing alternative fuels.  More specifically, 
Republican opposition has stymied efforts of increasing DOD alternative fuel usage.  
This will be examined in the next section. 
 The DOD Operational Energy Strategy is the result of a careful analysis of the 
risks and vulnerabilities of U.S. military dependence on fossil fuels.  A result of the 
analysis resulted in identifying energy as a key security issue, and prompted a policy 
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response.  Before policy decisions can be made, it is first necessary to define the issue.  
The Pentagon completed this task in the 2010 QDR, wherein it identified the issue of 
‘energy security’ and offered a definition of the term.  Defining the term has given the 
Pentagon an understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the issue of 
energy security, and have allowed it to propose and pursue a coherent and integrated 
policy solution aimed at increasing not only military energy security, but by reducing 
U.S. military consumption of fossil fuel, it would also increase the energy security of the 
U.S. as a nation. 
 
Part V: Why Congress Fails to Support DOD’s Energy Strategy  
 The U.S. Congress, as it has been previously noted, has not defined the term 
‘energy security.’  Not having a working definition of the term would seem to make 
crafting a cohesive and integrated policy aimed at increasing national energy security 
difficult.  Lacking a definition of the term hints of a wider problem – not having analyzed 
the risks and vulnerabilities of fossil fuel dependence, and how best to mitigate those 
vulnerabilities through a cohesive policy response.  Underscoring the lack of a definition 
on the part of Congress are the partisan divisions that run through a divided Congress, 
with policy decisions often decided by political ideology and prejudices.   
The DOD and Navy’s attempt to use alternative fuels has become a political 
flashpoint in a larger, political battle: the use of government funds to finance new energy 
technology.  Yet because Congress has not defined the term ‘energy security,’ there is no 
agreement or consensus in Congress over what a comprehensive and integrated policy 
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addressing the issue of energy security should look like.  The result is a policy that is 
tenuous at best, and unpredictable at worst.  The failure to conceptualize the issue of 
‘energy security’ leaves policies aimed at increasing U.S. energy security, such as DOD’s 
push for alternative fuels, in limbo and in jeopardy of not being funded every Congress 
based on the political fortunes of politicians. 
 The recent rise domestic oil and gas production in the U.S. is also weakening the 
call for a domestic-based biofuel industry supported by the Pentagon.  As domestic 
production rises, decreasing U.S. reliance on imported foreign oil, U.S. oil and gas 
lobbies are increasing their efforts to undermine the effort to establish a biofuel industry 
as an alternative to petroleum fuel.
117
  Despite the rise in domestic oil and gas output, the 
oil and gas produced in the U.S. is still part of the global market for oil and gas.  This 
means that even oil and gas produced in the U.S. is subject to the price volatility of oil, 
and to the “security premium” when it occurs. 
 Many of the Members of Congress that are opposed to the Navy’s biofuel 
program are often opposed due to political interests and considerations.  While a majority 
of the lawmakers that oppose the Navy’s biofuel program are Republican, Democrats 
have also crossed the divide to oppose the alternative fuel effort by DOD and the Navy.  
These lawmakers take campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry, or represent 
a part of the country that is heavily dependent on coal.
118
  Despite the DNC’s inclusion of 
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alternative fuels in its energy issue brief, the Senate version of the NDAA during the 
112
th
 Congress, S. 3254, had two restrictive amendments, S. Amdts. 314 and 2823, added 
during the Senate Armed Services Committee markup.  The amendments would have 
restricted DOD’s ability to purchase alternative fuels or invest biofuel production.
119
  The 
prohibitive amendments passed a Senate Armed Services Committee controlled by the 
Democrats, a party that has included biofuels in its energy plan for the U.S.           
 Representative Mike Conway (R-TX) epitomizes the political divide that prevents 
Congress from coming to an agreement over efforts aimed at increasing U.S. energy 
security, via the Navy’s biofuel program.  According to OpenSecrets.org, Representative 
Conway receives a large proportion of his campaign contributions from oil and gas 
interests.
120
  It should not be surprising then that Representative Conway alone proposed 
energy-related legislation opposing the Navy’s biofuel program in the markup process of 
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013 during the 112
th
 Congress.  
The legislation proposed and passed, H.R. 4310, contained provisions similar to the 
Senate amendments that were added in committee markup, aimed at limiting DOD’s 
ability to both purchase and invest in alternative fuels that are more expensive than 
petroleum fuels, and would have all but ended the DOD’s pursuit of alternative fuels if 
passed by Congress.
121
  The legislation advanced from both the Republican-controlled 
House Armed Services Committee and U.S. House of Representatives.  
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 With each party controlling a legislative chamber on the Hill, and each party 
having a different policy agenda for energy policy, getting a majority to come to a 
consensus on policy will be difficult for the DOD and Navy in future efforts.  Midterm 
elections may swing the debate on the Navy’s biofuel program, if either party is able to 
wrest control of the other chamber from the other party.  Similarly, the presidential 
election in 2016 has the potential to bring in a new Republican administration, likely 
ending Federal funding for biofuel initiatives that the Obama Administration has been 
willing to fund.  The fight over funding for the Navy’s biofuel initiatives is now almost 
cyclical, with the NDAA coming to the committees for authorization each year.  And 
with each attempt to get funding, there are disputes over exactly how far the government 
should go in investing in industry.   
This thesis believes, however, that if Congress conceptualized the issue of ‘energy 
security’ and defined the term and vocabulary, the debate surrounding the Navy’s biofuel 
initiatives would be different than the debate currently surrounding DOD’s efforts at 
diversifying its energy sources.  A look again at Senator Ted Cruz’s questioning of 
Secretary Mabus highlights the lack of understanding of the issues surrounding energy 
security, and efforts aimed at increasing U.S. energy security.  Senator Cruz, in 
questioning Secretary Mabus, refers to the potential loss of two Marine battalions as the 
priority for the Navy to keep, not “research algae fuel.”
122
  What the Senator fails to 
understand is that the potential loss of Marine battalions is directly correlated to shrinking 
defense budgets, and the billions of dollars DOD has to pay each year for fuel than was 
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not originally budgeted for.  Secretary Mabus was correct when replying to the Senator 
that, if DOD does not get some competition to compete with the price DOD pays for 
fossil fuels, then there will be “fewer soldiers, fewer sailors, fewer platforms.”
123
   
A related incident at a Congressional hearing in the 112
th
 Congress further 
underscores the lack of conceptualization Congress has on the issue of ‘energy security’.  
During a House Armed Services Committee hearing in February 2012, Representative 
Randy Forbes (R-VA) reminded Secretary Mabus that he was “not the secretary of 
energy.”
124
  The large amounts of energy consumed by DOD, and the Navy in particular, 
would make Secretary Mabus a reliable witness to the need of the U.S. military to reduce 
its reliance on petroleum fuels.  The acerbic remark by Rep. Forbes reinforces the belief 
that Congress does not truly have an understanding of the vulnerability of U.S. national 
security posed by dependence on petroleum fuels, given the large amount of petroleum 
fuel consumed by DOD, the largest organizational user of petroleum in the world. 
 A similar argument can be made against the claim that the government should not 
invest in industry.  Energy is not the first industry the U.S. military will collaborate and 
work with.  There is a long and successful history of collaboration between the U.S. 
military and industry, including some of the world’s most important and critical 
technology, such as semiconductors and the Internet.
125
  As another Republican Member 
of Congress, Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA) reminded Secretary Mabus, “You’re 
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not the secretary of energy, you’re the secretary of the Navy.”
126
  Yet again, a Member of 
Congress fails to understand the wider implications of collaboration between the military 
and industry on energy.  Namely, that the benefits of DOD’s efforts to increase its own 
energy security will have benefits for the wider U.S. energy sector as well.
127
  This may 
be contributed to the lack of a Congressional definition for ‘energy security,’ including an 
understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities that come with the issue of energy security. 
 Sharon E. Burke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans 
and Programs, once remarked that “our primary rationale is not economic, our job is to 
defend the country.”
128
  While the Pentagon will always be vulnerable to charges of 
wasteful spending, it should be noted that Congress supports wasteful weapons programs 
because they are politically beneficial, and are often associated with jobs and economic 
gains in a Member’s home district.  What legislators fail to understand is that the 
potential benefits of alternative fuels, including biofuel, far outweigh concerns over 
wasteful spending or concerns over the government interfering in the free market.  The 
energy industry is no different from other defense programs, and has the ability to 
become an economic driver in the U.S. by creating jobs and supporting other industries 
that would contribute to a biofuel industry, such as agriculture.   
There exists a profound misunderstanding of energy security in Congress, and that 
the high cost of fossil fuel is not limited to just dollars.  There is a human cost associated 
with fuel, and this has not been emphasized enough.  DOD’s understanding of the issue 
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of energy security and its profound implications for U.S. national security may be 
contributed to its ability to define the term, and assess its risks and vulnerabilities from its 
definition.  Similarly, a lack of a definition of the term has hindered Congressional ability 
to see the threat that dependence on fossil fuels has not only on U.S. military security, but 
also to a greater extent, U.S. national security. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to look at the lack of a definition and concept for 
‘energy security’ in Congress, and its implications for U.S. energy policy.  The premise at 
the beginning of the chapter inferred that because Congress lacked a definition and 
conceptualization of ‘energy security,’ and thus an understanding of the risks and 
vulnerabilities of energy security issues, an attempt by DOD to pursue its own policies to 
address DOD related energy security issues would result in not only policy deadlock, but 
policy driven by political interests to the detriment of sound energy policy.  The resulting 
examination found this to be true.  While current DOD biofuel policy is slowly moving 
forward, it is fragile.  A change in administrations in the 2016 election, or if a single party 
is able to control both chambers of Congress, DOD’s progress in establishing assured and 
reliable supplies of energy through an Operational Energy Strategy may be completely 
reversed. 
 The conflict over policy can be seen at every Senate and House committee 
hearing regarding the Department of the Navy’s attempts to increase U.S. military energy 
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security.  While Congress has largely supported other elements of DOD’s Operational 
Energy Strategy, Congress continues to oppose alternative fuels, including biofuels.  The 
success of DOD’s energy strategy lies largely on its ability to reduce its consumption of 
fossil fuels and diversify its energy supply.  Continued dependence on fossil fuels will 
continue to inhibit DOD’s future ability to make decisions affecting the future of the 
force, when a large part of a shrinking DOD budget is consumed by fuel costs.   This 
conflict is unnecessary and could be avoided had Congress established and 
conceptualized the term ‘energy security.’  A large part of this conflict over policy can be 
attributed to a Congress that has allowed political interests, in the absence of any concept 
of how to measure or increase ‘energy security’, to oppose any alternative industry or 
policy to fossil fuels.  A legislative conceptualization of the term would be a good place 
to start, something that has never been done in 40 years of trying.  Policy conflicts over 
diversifying the nation’s energy sources will continue, so long as Congress and DOD 
continue to use differing concepts.  Or, in the case of Congress, no concept at all.  After 









Chapter 3:  What Affect Does the U.S. Department of Energy 
Have on U.S. Energy Policy? 
 
Introduction 
 The central theme of this thesis has concerned itself with how the United States is 
addressing the issue of energy security, through the prism of energy policy.  The previous 
two chapters examined the effects of not having a single coherent definition, or 
conceptualization, of ‘energy security’ on U.S. energy policy concerning infrastructure 
(the KXL pipeline), and alternative fuels (DOD energy strategy).  The research 
demonstrated that in each case, without a definition or concept of the issue from the 
Federal government, special interests, in the case of the KXL pipeline, or narrow political 
interests, in the case of DOD energy strategy, have been allowed to fill the conceptual 
and definitional void, and formulate or oppose potential energy policies to their benefit, 
at the expense of U.S. security.  The thesis thus far has not examined the one cabinet-
level agency with “energy” in its name – the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).  An 
examination of U.S. energy security would not be complete without an analysis involving 
the U.S. DOE, and the role the department plays in developing energy security policy in 
the United States. 
 This final chapter will seek to explore how the U.S. DOE develops and 
implements U.S. energy policy, and the role of the department in developing U.S. energy 
security strategy.  This chapter’s hypothesis states that the DOE, as the nation’s cabinet-
level department with “energy” in its name, should be at the forefront of developing a 
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cohesive and integrated national energy policy, as well as defining and conceptualizing 
the term ‘energy security.’  In other words, how much influence does the U.S. DOE have 
on developing a national energy policy?   
Firstly, in order to fully understand DOE’s role in policy development, the 
analysis will examine DOE’s statutory responsibility, from which all Federal agencies 
derive their authority to make policy from.  Secondly, an analysis will also examine the 
policy decisions other Federal agencies are taking that influence national energy policy 
today, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the 
Interior (DOI).  These departments have made significant decisions regarding energy 
policy in recent years, which reflect their ability to decide and influence policy 
independently of the DOE.  This will help determine the ability of DOE to lead and 
develop not only national energy policy, but also a definition and concept of ‘energy 
security’ for the U.S. to follow.  An examination will also be made of the structural 
authority that oversees energy policy in the U.S., and whether the right structure is in 
place to have a coordinated national energy policy.  Finally, upon completion of the 








National Energy Policies, Past and Present 
 Before the 1970s, the Federal government had a limited role in the development 
and formulation U.S. national energy policy.  Before 1977, the U.S. did not have a 
cabinet-level department dedicated to the issue of energy.  Instead, the U.S. relied on and 
expected private industry to produce and distribute the energy needed.
129
  U.S. energy 
policy formulation before 1977 could be described as “an ad hoc process.”
130
  No overall 
policy for energy existed, as U.S. officials thought in terms of “particular fuels, 
technologies, and resources” rather than “energy.”
131
   
Two factors brought about the need for a cabinet-level department for energy 
however.  The first was the Federal government’s role in developing and 
commercializing nuclear energy; the second was the energy crisis of the mid-1970s.
132
  
The Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-91), passed on August 4, 
1977 established the Department of Energy (DOE) and consolidated government energy 
functions into the newly created department.  The goal of the newly created department 
was to “establish and observe policies consistent with a coordinated energy policy” and 
to “provide for a mechanism through which a coordinated national energy policy can be 
formulated and implemented to deal with the short-, mid- and long-term energy problems 
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  With a Congressional mandate, it would be assumed that the U.S. 
would have a more integrated, cohesive, and coherent energy strategy. 
However, despite the DOE having the mandate and mission to coordinate a 
consistent U.S. energy policy, there has been a long list of legislation attempting to solve 
the problem of “energy independence” and “energy security.”  While this chapter and 
thesis will focus on more recent attempts at U.S. energy security policy, a sample of 
legislation as witness to these attempts include:  
The Energy Independence Act of 1975; Energy Independence Authority 1976; 
Enabling act of the DOE 1977; National Energy Act 1978; Various acts (e.g. SFC, 
MFEE) 1980; Energy Independence Act of 1989; American Energy Independence Act of 
1991; National Energy Security Act of 1992; Energy Independence, Infrastructure, and 
Investment Act of 1993; Domestic Oil and Gas Crisis Tax Relief and Foreign Oil 
Reliance Reversal Act of 1999; Energy Independence for America Act of 2000; Energy 
Independence Act of 2001; Biofuels Energy Independence Act of 2001; Putting the Pedal 
to the Metal: Accelerating the Energy Independence of America Act; New Manhattan 
Project for Energy Independence; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; and 
the Energy Independence Now Act of 2009.
134
 
Despite the plethora of attempts at passing legislation aimed at increasing U.S. 
energy security, U.S. energy policy still lacked cohesion and coordination.  This may be 
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accounted for by the lack of any conceptualization of what “energy security” is and what 
it means to the U.S.  Such a lack of conceptualization has led to Federal energy policy to 
continue to be disjointed and piecemeal.  Another contributing factor to this may be the 
lack of authority for DOE to coordinate energy policy at the Federal level, despite the 
DOE being created at the cabinet-level for exactly this purpose.  The assessment that U.S. 
energy policy is also observed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in a report 
released in December 2014, which has acknowledged that the lack of an overarching 
policy hamstrings U.S. potential.
135
  
 More recent attempts at developing a national energy policy are illustrative of 
this point.  In May of 2001, a report from the National Energy Policy Development 
Group (NEPDG), entitled “National Energy Policy,” was released.  The NEPDG was 
created on January 29, 2001 by the new Bush administration to develop a national energy 
policy.  The group was comprised of cabinet-level officials and other senior federal level 
officials, and chaired by the Vice President.  The directive President Bush gave the 
NEPDG was to “develop a national energy policy designed to help the private sector, 
and, as necessary and appropriate, State and local governments promote dependable, 
affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the 
future.”
136
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   The National Energy Policy report produced by the NEPDG mentioned the term 
“energy security” 40 times, while not once offering a definition or conceptualization of 
the term to base its usage on.  The report also contained over 100 recommendations for 
new legislative proposals and executive actions.  Yet not one of the over 100 
recommendations was to give more statutory authority, or to transfer the energy related 
responsibilities of other cabinet-level departments to the DOE to better coordinate and 
formulate an overall U.S. energy policy.  To the contrary, it became obvious from the 
report’s recommendations that several cabinet-level departments play a role in the 
formulation of U.S. energy policy.  This may also be an impediment to the ability of the 
U.S. to form a national energy policy today.   
These departments include the Department of the Interior, Department of the 
Treasury, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce, Department of State, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency.  With so many departments involved in 
formulating energy policy, it is possible to see why a there is a lack of consensus in 
conceptualizing energy as a security issue.  It is also possible to see how it is difficult for 
a single department, the DOE, to formulate and coordinate a consistent policy with 
cohesion between different agencies with well-defined measurable objectives.    
 
Structural Authority 
 It has been noted that political structure can make it difficult to develop a 





  A case study of energy policy in the U.S. illustrates this point.  
During a conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Moniz revealed 
that one difficulty in energy policy is the decision-making process, which is fragmented 
across different agencies in the federal government and committees in Congress.
138
  A 
major need recognized by the energy secretary was to get a process in place to bring 
together the different agencies, and bring a coherence across all federal agencies and 
policy, which may also have the potential to bring coherence to Congress and the 
fragmented committee structure that oversees U.S. energy policy.  The fragmentation in 
U.S. energy policy is illustrated in the two charts below.  Given the plethora of agencies 
with a role in the development of energy policy, it is easy to see how it is difficult for the 
DOE to conceptualize and define ‘energy security’, while also coordinating a cohesive 
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Figure 2.  Executive Agencies With A Role in Energy Policy 
 




Figure 3.  Congressional Committees With Energy Jurisdiction 
 





 Related to the fragmented authority problem of national policy making is the 
problem of divided government, with different political parties in control of different 
centers of authority.
139
  The role that divided government plays in developing national 
policy, and in this case energy policy, is profound.  Divided government is particularly 
important for policy consensus given the likelihood that one of the two major political 
parties is opposed to the other in regards to the role the government should play in 
energy.   
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, energy policy has generally been left to 
market forces.  However, if the DOE, or any government agency, is going to define and 
conceptualize ‘energy security,’ it will entail greater top-down decision-making, which 
will generate unease among Republicans, whom are largely skeptical not only about top-
down decision making, but also the idea that political authorities are better able to 
determine what the market desires.  This idea can be seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
where DOD biofuel policy was examined.  The strongest pushback the DOD received 
regarding the plan to lessen the military’s overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels, and 
thus the nation’s dependence, were from Republican Senators and Congressmen.  
Finally, a third issue related to the fragmented and divided government that 
impedes national energy policy development is the constant change or shift in policies 
that result in the frequent changes in control of government by the two major political 
parties.
140
  This can be best illustrated by the plethora of energy security related acts and 
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legislation that was listed at the beginning of this chapter.  U.S. energy policy is afflicted 
by the lack of sustained policies, in which there is a lack of a long-term commitment to 
any one-policy initiative.   As noted earlier, each piece of legislation reflected the 
priorities of that administration, or the interests and priorities of Congressional 
committees.  Shifting priorities in energy policy are evident in each administration’s 
attempt to have a national energy policy, from Nixon to Ford, from Carter to Reagan, 
from H.W. Bush to Clinton, and from W. Bush to Obama.  This may help explain why 
U.S. energy policy has lacked consistent coordination and cohesion. 
The idea of shifting policies and changing priorities can be seen again from the 
discussion in Chapter 2.  The current administration has emphasized and supported the 
DOD energy strategy, however; with a new administration in 2017, this policy may either 
shift or change.  The ability of policies to come and go only hampers the ability to 
conceptualize and have a long-term vision for what ‘energy security’ is to the U.S. 
Despite the fragmentation of authority over energy policy decision-making, 
administrations have attempted to use interagency processes in order to attempt coherent 
energy policy.  Shortly after coming to office in 2001, President George W. Bush ordered 
the National Energy Policy Development Group to develop a comprehensive national 
energy policy.  The group was comprised of several Cabinet members, including the 
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of the Interior, Department 
of Commerce, Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.   
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While the term ‘energy security’ was mentioned over 30 times in the report to 
develop a national energy policy, not once was a concept or definition of what the term 
‘energy security’ meant was put forth by the group.  The group recommended 105 
specific proposals to increase U.S. energy security.  Despite linking energy security with 
U.S. trade and foreign policy, the group failed to conceptualize the issue of energy 
security, even though they had mapped out the strategic importance of energy from our 
domestic concerns to our foreign policy concerns.  Not included among the 105 proposals 
was a concept or strategic vision of long-term U.S. energy security, only piecemeal 
recommendations.   
As previously discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the administration of Barack 
Obama is attempting the same interagency process to attempt a coherent energy policy, 
this time the Quadrennial Energy Review, as a work-around for the lack of a lead agency 
and singular concept of ‘energy security.’   The goal of the QER is to provide the U.S. 
with a comprehensive and integrated energy strategy resulting from interagency dialogue 
and active engagement of external stakeholders.  Unlike the National Energy Policy 
Development Group of the George W. Bush administration, the QER has defined energy 
security as needing  
“to be more broadly defined to cover not only oil, but other sources of supply, and 
to be based not only on the ability to withstand shocks, but also to be able to recover 
quickly from any shocks that do occur. In addition, security is not exclusively domestic; 
it is dependent on interactions in the interconnected global energy market. U.S. energy 
security and the infrastructure that supports it should be viewed in the context of this 
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Even with this definition of ‘energy security’ in the report, it remains to be seen if 
the review group will be able to develop a cohesive national energy policy that embodies 
the concept of ‘energy security’ that has been defined by the group.  This is only a first 
step in a long overdue process.  As the first QER is focused solely on energy 
transmission, storage, and distribution infrastructure, it remains to be seen if the next 
QER can build on the concept of ‘energy security’ envisioned in the inaugural edition of 
the QER.  What remains to be seen is if this new interagency mechanism will be an 
effective tool in place of a single, lead agency in energy security policy development.   
 
Department of Energy  
 The mission statement from DOE’s website gives the impression that the 
department plays a role in developing and conceptualizing energy security for the nation, 
that is, “to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, 
environmental and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology 
solutions.”
142
  The mission statement implies that the DOE is involved with developing 
energy policy, and specifically energy security related policy, as the statement clearly 
references addressing the nation’s energy challenges.  It is no surprise then that the 
Secretary of Energy, Dr. Ernest Moniz, has mentioned the issue of U.S. energy security 
during policy speeches. 
                                                          
142




 During a policy speech in October 2013 at the Center for Strategic and 




 US vulnerability to oil price volatility. 
 Climate change and associated natural disasters and humanitarian crisis’s that can 
result from climate change. 
 Nuclear energy and the link between power generation and weaponized 
applications. 
 Vulnerability of infrastructure. 
 
 
Despite outlining challenges to U.S. energy security, Secretary Moniz failed to 
outline a definition or concept of what, exactly, energy security is to the U.S.  Despite 
outlining the challenges to U.S. energy security, Secretary Moniz failed to address 
how the DOE would conceptualize the challenges he listed above into a coherent 
policy response.  This raises the questions of what role the DOE performs in policy to 
address such challenges, and how much statutory authority the DOE has to develop 
and implement such a policy.  In order to determine DOE’s ability to address such 
policy questions, an examination of the agency’s budget is necessary to determine the 
agency’s priorities, and therefore policy objectives.   
An analysis of DOE’s budget reflects the agency’s main priority:  maintaining the 
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and fissile material used to make nuclear weapons.
144
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During fiscal year 2011, roughly two-thirds of DOE’s budget, 63 percent, went to 
Atomic Energy Defense Activities, a formal line item on the department’s U.S. 
government budget.
145
  While the DOE plays a large role in the federal government’s 
R&D programs and related science programs, the majority of the department’s budget 
is directed to activities that may prevent it from focusing on energy security. The FY 
2016 (fiscal year) budget request from the DOE continues to reflect this lack of 
budgetary focus.  Secretary Moniz has stated that the FY 2016 budget request 
reflected the government’s energy strategy and the department’s commitment to 
promoting the President’s energy strategy.
146
          
 Despite the Energy Secretary’s statement that the DOE budget reflected energy 
strategy, the numbers in the budget did not reflect strategy.  Weapons activities accounted 
for $8.8 billion in the FY 2016, request, far more than any other program dedicated to 
R&D or energy strategy.  This also represented an increase of 10.2% over the previous 
FY 2015 request.
147
  It is hard to imagine the DOE playing a large role in national energy 
policy development, when such a large proportion of its budget is not devoted to energy 
policy.  Throughout the DOE’s history, much of its budget has been allocated to nuclear 
activities, while DOE’s non-nuclear budget has remained near constant during its 38 year 
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history, and has not seen any significant increase in funding related to policy 
development. 
Figure 4. DOE Budget History 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy 
 
Role of Other Federal Agencies Driving Energy Policy 
 Despite its namesake, there are other federal agencies that are currently playing a 
larger role than DOE in driving the nation’s energy policy.  This section will briefly 
examine the EPA and DOI, which are both playing large parts in shaping the future of 
U.S. energy policy, something that the DOE should be doing, yet does not have the 
policy or regulatory authority to do. 
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 In June 2014, the EPA proposed the Clean Power Plan, a new set of federal 
regulations that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector.
148
  The 
new rules were introduced as a result of the current administration’s attempt to mitigate 
climate change.  The new EPA rules are part of a pledge the current administration has 
made to cut U.S. greenhouse emissions by up to 28 percent over the next decade.  The 
new rules would set carbon dioxide targets for states, requiring them to trim emissions.  
More specifically, the first-ever rules would target emissions from new coal-fired power 
plants.
149
  However, the EPA has also proposed new rules for makers of heavy-duty 
trucks, requiring an increase in fuel efficiency by up to 24 percent.  The EPA has also 
taken the first steps towards regulating greenhouse gas emissions from airplanes.  Unlike 
the current proposed rules, which are expected to be finalized in the coming months, rules 
regulating emissions from airlines are expected to take years to write and finalize.
150
   
 The new EPA rules represent a significant policy choice, and one in which there 
seemed to be little or no consultation with DOE about the nation’s mix of energy use.  
The new rules give the EPA significant sway over the direction of industry, and may 
accelerate the decrease in the use of fossil fuels as an energy source, which would 
represent a significant policy decision.  While the new rules were proposed as part of the 
administration’s plan to combat climate change, it is hard to see the role that the DOE 
played in determining the long-term plan for America’s future energy usage.  As the 
agency charged with developing energy policy, the first-ever EPA rules targeting 
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emissions from power plants are doing so without input from the DOE.  This highlights 
not only the fragmentation of authority over energy policy in the U.S., but also the 
vulnerability of the new greenhouse gas emission cuts are to differing political agendas 
and priorities.  In 2017, there is no guarantee that a new administration will continue with 
these cuts, especially given Republican opposition to the EPA in general and the new 
EPA rules in particular. 
  The Department of the Interior (DOI) is also a central driver of U.S. energy 
policy, and like the EPA, it is also making decisions independently of the DOE.  The DOI 
is responsible for all public land in the U.S., and manages about 500 million acres.  From 
these public lands, the U.S. produces energy, both fossil and renewable.  New advances 
in drilling have increased U.S. oil production to its highest point in 20 years.  The DOI 
has also proposed new offshore drilling in both the Atlantic coast and the artic.  For the 
DOI, it must now balance energy production with conservation, a task that it might not be 
able to manage, since the agency has not yet produced a long-term strategy for energy 
development and usage.  The task of long-term energy strategy and planning should be 
under the DOE.    
 The EPA and DOI were chosen to illustrate the major policy impacts that 
agencies other then the DOE were having when it comes to developing national energy 
policy.  The policy decisions being made at both the EPA and DOI have a far larger 
impact on energy policy than anything the DOE has contributed.  This is also the problem 
that underscores what little affect the DOE has on developing national energy policy.  
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The two agencies above were also selected for examination to highlight a long-held 
criticism of U.S. energy policy:  it is often inconsistent and contradictory.   
While the EPA is pushing aggressively, with the support of the current 
administration, to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the DOI, also with support form he 
current administration, is expanding offshore drilling in the Atlantic and in the Artic, 
while also opening up more federal land for fossil fuel development.  This is the 
contradiction in U.S. energy policy:  while pursuing policies that cut U.S. greenhouse 
emissions, the U.S. is also pursuing policies that have increased U.S. fossil fuel 
production to their highest levels in 20 years.   
It is in this type of situation that a strong DOE is needed, and should have the 
authority to craft and coordinate a cohesive, long-term U.S. energy policy.  However, 
until there is a solution to the structural fragmentation and short-term shifting policies 
that plague the ability of the U.S. to develop a national energy policy, the U.S. will have 
to come to terms with having a weak DOE, that is not focused on energy policy, and is 
not the driving force behind U.S. energy policy.  Instead of focusing on conceptualizing 
‘energy security’ and developing a long-term strategy to secure the energy future of the 
U.S., the DOE is focused instead on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter sought to answer the following question: What affect does the U.S. 
Department of Energy have on U.S. energy policy?  The proliferation of agencies and 
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Congressional committees with oversight of energy policy makes it difficult for any 
single agency to have a role in developing a cohesive and coordinated national energy 
policy.  Combined with our political system of divided government and short-term 
shifting policies, and the answer is obvious.  The U.S. Department of Energy has little 
ability to affect the development of national energy policy, in either the short-term or the 
long-term.  Simply put, the DOE simply does not have the statutory authority over the 
policy areas it needs to in order to coordinate long-term energy strategy development.  
The aforementioned agencies that currently have more affect in developing U.S. energy 
policy are not tasked with nor designed to address the long-term strategic energy needs of 
the nation.  Nor are the aforementioned agencies prepared to conceptualize ‘energy 
security’ and lead a coordinated energy strategy.  Based on the analysis of this chapter, it 
is clear that the current mission, budget, and authority of the DOE is inadequate for the 
agency to fully develop and coordinate a national energy policy for the U.S.  However, 
despite the repeated failures of administrations past and present to grapple with the need 
for a long-term energy policy that identifies the nation’s energy security needs and 
challenges, there is little to no evidence to support the premise that reform is needed, and 
to do so would mean taking concrete steps to streamline policy authority in favor of a 










 This thesis has explored the effects of not having a single definition or 
conceptualization of the term ‘energy security’ on U.S. energy policy in order to test a 
hypothesis that assumed that without such a single concept to guide U.S. energy security 
strategy, U.S. policy would be divided and incoherent.  The research presented 
throughout this paper has proved this assumption to be correct.  From infrastructure 
development in Chapter 1 to defense policy Chapter 2, there has been an abundance of 
evidence to demonstrate that without a common concept, definition, or agreeable 
objective regarding energy security, U.S. energy policy is inconsistent and lacks long-
term vision.  Moreover, despite the number of agencies with the influence to shape 
national energy policy, the one agency that should be leading U.S. energy policy 
paradoxically has not been in the lead in developing national energy policy.  The analysis 
of Chapter 3 demonstrated that the U.S. DOE is not prepared to coordinate a cohesive 
energy strategy centered on the concept of U.S. energy security.  
 There are several areas that additional studies would be welcome to continue the 
analysis presented in this thesis.  First, the difference in energy policies pursued by 
different federal agencies has been observed as inconsistent.  However, the difference in 
energy policies and concepts pursued by 50 individual states are surely as different, and 
may conflict with federal energy policy.  Future scholars of this topic would be well 
advised to conduct an analysis of the potential conflict between energy policies at the 
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state and federal level.  Such an analysis, which could include an exploration of authority 
fragmentation, or a lack of fragmentation, and divided government at the state level, 
would be a useful addition to the existing body of work regarding the formulation of a 
national energy policy. 
 Second, while the U.S. does not have a conceptualization of energy security, there 
are other countries that have conceptualized, defined, and have a long-term strategy for 
their energy security strategy.  In November 2012, the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change in Great Britain release a strategy document entitled “Energy Security 
Strategy.”
151
  The document conceptualized the issue of energy security, and laid out a 
long-term vision for securing Britain’s energy future.  An analysis of Great Britain’s 
energy security, juxtaposed against the U.S., using measurable objectives, would be a 
useful analysis in measuring how effective national energy security policies are.  While 
this thesis was narrow and focused exclusively on the U.S., a study of how different 
nations have conceptualized energy security would be a useful addition to this body of 
work.       
 Finally, April 2015 saw the release of the first ever Quadrennial Energy Review 
(QER).  While this thesis did not explore the policy effects, recommendations or 
implications of the QER, the analysis in this thesis demonstrated the need for a regular 
review of U.S. energy policy.  An area of future study would be to focus on the QER, and 
its ability to affect change in the way U.S. energy policy is formulated and coordinated.  
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An analysis of the QER’s recommendations, pared with the finding’s of this thesis, would 
be a valuable contribution to the body of work on the effects of inconsistent, non-
cohesive, and un-coordinated energy policies and their effects on the ability of nations to 
increase their energy security.    
 Additional studies aside, this thesis demonstrates that U.S. energy policy lacks 
coordination and a long-term vision.  As long as decision making over energy security 
policy is fragmented over a plethora of agencies and committees, each with their own 
narrow political or special interest driving them, the prospect of the U.S. increasing its 
energy security will continue to remain elusive.  Despite the need of an over-arching 
policy and a conceptualization of energy security for the future, officials at the highest 
level have clearly acknowledged the problem of fragmentation that prevents a national 
energy policy from taking shape, as evidence in Chapter 3 demonstrates.  It is apparent 
that the current process and structure in place for deciding national energy policies is 
woefully inadequate.    
 There are clear obstacles to reforming U.S. energy policy and the process through 
which it is determined.  The willingness of the political leaders to settle on a concept of 
energy security that is right for the nation is perhaps the prevalent obstacle to getting a 
national energy policy in place.  This would also entail breaking the four-year election 
cycle that often signals the shift or change in energy policies from one administration to 
another.      
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 Despite these challenges, the analysis presented in this thesis identifies 
opportunities to reform U.S. energy policy, and give it the cohesion and coordination that 
is needed to increase U.S. energy security.  The need for this conceptualization and long-
term strategy has been noted by both prominent scholars and by intergovernmental 
organizations.  One leading scholar on the topic of energy security, Daniel Yergin, has 
stated the need for the U.S. to decide the pace and scale of domestic energy development 
as well as the mix of energy resources that will compose what we use.
152
  The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has also identified the lack of a long-term strategy 
and policy hurts U.S. energy potential, and poses environmental risks.
153
 
 With a review of U.S. energy policy currently under way with the QER, U.S. 
officials should now consider making reforms to energy policy.  Given the number of 
agencies with a role in influencing energy policy, it is believed that both political parties 
would be receptive to streamlining and eliminating some of the redundancy that currently 
inhibits the formulation of a national energy policy.   
 First, the DOE budget should be re-prioritized to reflect its mission of increasing 
the energy security of the U.S.  Responsibility for maintaining the nation’s nuclear 
weapons should be transferred to an agency that is more suited to handling defense 
activities.  The DOD would be an agency that is well equipped to deal with nuclear 
weapons.  This would allow the DOE to re-focus its budget on developing an energy 
security strategy, and allow more coordination and oversight of national energy policies.   
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 Second, the number of agencies with oversight of energy related issues should be 
reduced, transferring those oversight responsibilities to the DOE.  Strengthening the DOE 
should be the key of any reform effort.  Currently, the DOE is perhaps the federal agency 
with the least influence over energy policy, despite it being the only agency with ‘energy’ 
in its title.  Strengthening the DOE will allow for a more coordinated effort at national 
energy policy, while perhaps also reducing the amount of contradictions that are currently 
in U.S. energy policy.  With a single agency overseeing national energy policy, it would 
perhaps then be possible to enact a national energy security strategy.   
 Given the complicated political, economic, environmental and security issues that 
underlines U.S. energy policy, any attempts to reform U.S. national energy policy will be 
difficult.  However, given that the U.S. has lacked a long-term strategy for its energy 
security, reforming our energy strategy now could pay significant dividends in the future, 
as the competition for scarce resources and the effects of climate change continue to be 
felt.  Rather than continuing down the same path of wondering what to do about energy 
every four years, perhaps now is a time to reform energy policy, conceptualize energy 
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